








Target Loans, Current Account Balances 
and Capital Flows: 





CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3500 
CATEGORY 7: MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
24 JUNE 2011 
 
 
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded 
• from the SSRN website:    www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:   www.RePEc.org 
• from the CESifo website:  www.CESifo-Group.org/wp 2 
 
Target Loans, Current Account Balances 
and Capital Flows:  The ECB’s Rescue 
Facility 
Hans-Werner Sinn and Timo Wollmershäuser
1 
24 June 2011 
Target Loans through the Eurosystem –The Bundesbank Statements – What are the Target 
Balances? – Credit Shifts in the Euro Zone – Economic Interpretation of the Credit Shifts – 
Current Account Balances, Capital Flight and Target Loans – Five Minutes to Midnight – 
Target Balances in the USA – Appendix: Reply to the Critics 
 
Abstract 
The European Monetary Union is stuck in a severe balance of payments crisis. Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain in particular have suffered from balance of payment deficits 
whose accumulated value, as measured by the Target balances in the national central banks’ 
balance sheets, was 314 billion euros in March 2011. The national central banks of these 
countries covered the deficits by creating and lending out additional central bank money that 
flowed to the euro core countries, Germany in particular, and crowded out the central bank 
money resulting  from local refinancing operations. Thus the ECB forced a public capital flow 
from the core countries to the peripheral countries that partly compensated for the now 
reluctant private capital flows.  
JEL codes: E50, E58, E63, F32, F34. 
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The European Monetary Union is stuck in a severe balance of payments crisis. The extent of 
accumulated payment deficits, as measured by the so-called Target liabilities of the GIPS 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), amounted to 314 billion euros in March 2011. 
This is the additional central bank money that their corresponding National Central Banks 
(NCBs) have loaned in excess of the money needed for domestic purposes to pay for a net 
inflow of goods and assets such as companies, stocks, government bonds or other banking 
claims from other countries.  
 
•  The GIPS share in the overall stock of Euroystem’s central bank credit was 66% in 
March 2011, although these countries account for only 18% of the euro zone’s 
economic activity. 
•  Fully 90% of the refinancing loans granted to the GIPS commercial banks by their 
central banks were Target loans, i.e. money  created and loaned by the respective 
NBCs to cover a deficit in the balance of payments and  that left the jurisdiction to 
circulate elsewhere.   
•  88% of the current account deficits of the GIPS over the past three years were balance 
of payment deficits  financed by money printing. 
 
  When the financial crisis hit and the private capital markets were no longer willing to 
provide unlimited credit to the countries on Europe’s periphery, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) stepped in to fulfil that role. It tolerated the credit creation of the NCBs and also 
actively supported it by accepting collateral of ever lower quality for the refinancing 
operations. The ECB acted correctly when the crisis began, the parliaments had no time to 
react, and the collapse of various economies had to be averted. But this nonetheless was de 
facto a massive bailout, a fiscal measure that does not constitute monetary policy. There has 
by now been ample time to hand the issue over to the parliaments of Europe.  
  The funds flowing from the GIPS to the core euro countries that are reflected by the 
Target imbalances have led to a retrenchment of the refinancing operations with the 
commercial banks in the latter, because the demand for liquidity was limited. The empirical 
facts we show here are very clear on this point. As the additional money created by the NCBs 
of the GIPS for the net acquisition of foreign goods and assets in other euro countries has 
neither altered the trend of the monetary base nor its allocation to the various parts of the euro 
area, it led in its entirety to a reduction in central bank credit (refinancing operations) in the 
core euro countries. The shift in credit from the core to the GIPS over the past three years 
amounted to about 100 billion euros annually.  
  The German Bundesbank was involved inasmuch as most of the money freshly 
“printed” in the GIPS flowed into its jurisdiction and crowded out its refinancing operations 
one to one. Germany was involved through foreign trade and as a safe haven for fleeing 
capital in uncertain times. As a compensation for the credits that it could have given to the 
German commercial banks, and thus indirectly for the export of goods and assets from 
Germany, the Bundesbank did acquire a corresponding claim on the Eurosystem.  
  The financing of the countries in the euro zone’s periphery through the shift of central 
bank credit from the core countries cannot be sustained much longer, as it is will meet its 
natural end when the stock of central bank credit in the core countries is exhausted. According 
to our estimates, that would  occur in 2013 should the volume of credit shifting continue at its 
current pace.  
  The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) planned to start operating in 2013 will 
therefore come at the right time, and the political rationale for it probably ran precisely along 
those lines: The ESM must  come because the ECB’s  potential for shifting credit to the 4 
 
periphery to compensate for the  balance of payment deficit would otherwise  be depleted 
soon.  
  Should the ECB nevertheless continue its policy of special loans for the countries in 
the periphery and deplete the stock of refinancing loans in the core countries, it would either 
have to accept an inflationary expansion of the monetary base, or the core countries’ NCBs 
would have to sterilise the inflowing money with gold sales or bond issues. In any case, the 
ECB would then lose the possibility to directly influence the economies of the core countries 
via its interest policy. The main refinancing rate would merely be relevant for the GIPS, and 
in the core countries a lower interbank lending rate would emerge. 
  It is open to debate what effect the 314-billion credit shift to the GIPS has had and will 
continue to have on the economies of the core countries. In any case,   for all practical 
purposes, this was a real loan to the GIPS from the euro community, which, like any other 
loan, made it possible for them to purchase more goods and assets abroad than would 
otherwise have been the case. In terms of liability, the international distribution of the 
monetary base, the international payment flows,  the credit relations among the countries and 
the transfer of resources actually involved, the operation is comparable to a special form of 
jointly and proportionately guaranteed Eurobonds to finance credit to the GIPS that are sold 
by a central European institution to the German state, for whose acquisition the German state 
borrows in the capital market. The fact that in the case of real Eurobonds the credit would 
flow directly to the states, while in the case of credit granted through the Eurosystem it flows 
to the corresponding NCBs and from them to the local commercial banks that transfer it on, 
be it to the government, if the commercial banks purchase government bonds, or to the private 
economy through regular loans, is from an economic perspective not really much of a 
difference. It is also economically irrelevant that the Bundesbank received the Target claim 
instead of the sovereign, since the Bundesbank is owned by the latter anyway. The only 
difference with real Eurobonds is the fact that the GIPS commercial banks could dispose of 
such credit at their leisure as long as they offered collateral, and that the NCBs of the core 
countries could not refuse to accept the purchase of the implicit Eurobonds. Whichever effects 
the credit shift has had on the economies of the countries involved, and whatever the risks for 
the creditor countries are: they are identical in the case of a credit shift through the 
Eurosystem to the ones that would arise from the emission of jointly guaranteed Eurobonds. 
  The possibility of taking on Target loans at the ECB interest rate is a fundamental and 
systemically risky design flaw of the euro as a common currency that came to light first 
through the sovereign debt crisis. It encourages a self-servicing attitude among the weaker 
members of the euro zone at the expense of the economically stronger ones,  leads to hefty 
foreign debts and undermines the ability of the ECB to influence with its interest-rate policy 
the economies of the countries where the surplus money is flowing to. This is why the US 
Federal Reserve system has endeavoured to make these loans unattractive. In the US, the 
Interdistrict Settlement Account (the US equivalent to the Target system) must be settled in 
April of every year with gold-backed securities or other marketable assets that bear the usual 
market rate of interest.  In the US, a Federal Reserve district (there are 12 altogether) is 
allowed to print more money than needed for its domestic circulation only if it hands over 
genuine, marketable assets to other districts.  
  A district that wishes to import more goods than it exports must receive private credit 
from another district or its district Fed must hand over marketable assets so that its capital 
import takes place at market conditions, and a district that wishes to acquire net assets from 
other districts must export more goods than it imports. It is not allowed to fulfil its wishes by 
simply cranking up the money-printing press as in the euro zone.   
  We advise the European Union to adopt the US rules in this respect, applying a 
transition rule for the over-indebted countries. We also urge the euro community to keep a 
tight rein on its bailout systems and to make sure that they won’t be abused by turning them 5 
 
into a policy of soft budget constraints. We are not against bailout systems, however; in fact, 
we think it was wrong for the Maastricht Treaty not to have specified them for the case a 
crisis occurs. In this respect, we concur with the recommendations of the European Economic 
Advisory Group at CESifo contained in their 2011 Report on the European Economy. They 




Target Loans through the Eurosystem 
 
Before and alongside the official support actions of the euro-zone countries for Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal, significant credit flows have taken place through the European interbank 
payment settlement system known as Target. The credit flows  came through refinancing 
operations and emergency loans (Emergency Liquidity Assistance, ELA) that far exceeded 
the funds necessary to settle these countries’ internal transactions. Officially, these credits are 
known as Target balances, but they were in effect, as we will show below, loans that, from an 
economics perspective, are comparable to short-term Eurobonds  and that have a fiscal 
character. Germany, for instance, had accumulated 326 billion euros in Target claims on the 
Eurosystem
2 to the end of 2010, while the aggregate liabilities of the GIPS, that is, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain, to the Eurosystem had risen to 340 billion euros by that time, as 
shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Target Balances in the Euro Zone (end of 2010) 
 
 
Sources: German Bundesbank, “The dynamics of the Bundesbank’s TARGET2 balance”, Monthly Report 63 (3), 
18 March 2011, p. 35; J. Whittaker, “Intra-eurosystem Debts”, Lancaster University Management School, 30 
March  2011, p. 1;  H.-W. Sinn, “Neue Abgründe”, Wirtschaftswoche, No. 8, 21 February 2011, p. 35; 
calculations by the authors. 
                                                   
2 The Eurosystem is made up of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 17 National Central Banks (NCBs) in 
the euro zone. 6 
 
  Ireland alone had accumulated 142 billion euros, and Greece 87 billion, in liabilities. 
Since the NCBs belong to their sovereigns and given the fact that they have transferred only 
certain activities to the ECB, which they established jointly, the Target imbalances are in 
effect claims and liabilities of the respective sovereigns. They bear the same interest rate as 
the ECB’s main refinancing rate at which the commercial banks can obtain central bank credit 
in the form of newly created money.
3 
  The Target imbalances went unnoticed for a long time, because they are not shown on 
the ECB’s balance sheet. They can be found, somewhat laboriously however, in the NCBs’ 
balance sheets. They can be reconstructed from the tables published there.
4 Furthermore, they 
can be found in the balance of payment statistics, where they are shown as an item in the 
financial account under the “Other Financial Transactions with Non-residents” position of the 
respective NCBs and as a stock figure in the external position of the respective NCBs as 
“Assets/Liabilities within the Eurosystem”.
5 
  Many think that the Target imbalances are a normal side-effect of the euro-zone 
payment system, as they are wont to occur in a currency system. This assessment is 
contradicted, however, by the dramatic evolution shown in Figure 2. The Target imbalances 
evidently started to grow by mid-2007, when the interbank market in Europe first broke 
down. Before that they were virtually zero. German claims, for instance, were only 5 billion 
euros in 2006. It is striking that a strong, albeit not perfect, correlation exists between the rise 
of the German Target claims and the rise in the Target liabilities of the GIPS. Other countries 
were involved, but their significance was small, as shown in Figure 1. The creditor countries 
included Luxembourg and the Netherlands, while on the debtor side France and Austria also 
stand out somewhat.
6 But the key players are, evidently, the GIPS and Germany.  
 
                                                   
3  German  Bundesbank, letter to the Ifo Institute dated 18 March 2011; cf. German Bundesbank, “Annual 
Report”, 2010, p. 170. 
4 In the case of the Bundesbank, the Target balances are contained under the position “Other Assets” in the 
Consolidated Balance Sheet of its Monthly Report (Bundesbank database, series TUB618). At the end of 2010, 
the figure for Other Assets amounted to 355.9 billion euros, whereas at the end of 2006 it had been only 24.8 
billion. The Bundesbank’s Annual Report breaks down these assets into more detail. In addition to the claims 
within the Eurosystem, which include the Target claims as well as the Bundesbank’s participating interest in the 
ECB and the claims arising from the transfer of foreign reserves to the ECB, this involves coins, tangible and 
intangible fixed assets, other financial assets, off-balance-sheet instruments, revaluation differences, accruals and 
prepaid expenses, and sundry items. The Bundesbank claims within the Eurosystem at the end of 2006 were 18.3 
billion euros, of which 5.4 billion were accounted for by Target claims and the rest by the Bundesbank’s 
participating interest in the ECB and the claims arising from the transfer of foreign reserves to the ECB. The 
remaining positions in the Other Assets accounted then for 6.4 billion euros. At the end of 2010, the claims 
within the Eurosystem amounted to 337.9 billion euros, and the participating interest (including the transfer of 
foreign reserves) amounted to 12.3 billion euros, which translates into a Target balance of 325.6 billion euros. 
The remaining positions under Other Assets amounted then to 18 billion euros. 
5  The claims listed in the external  position of the Bundesbank within the Eurosystem (after deducting the 
Bundesbank’s participating interest in the ECB and the claims arising from the transfer of foreign reserves to the 
ECB) rose from 5.4 billion euros at the end of 2006 to 325.6 billion euros at the end of 2010 (Bundesbank 
database, series EU8148). This refers again to the Target balance, as can be calculated from the Bundesbank’s 
balance sheet. The cumulative capital exports of the Bundesbank in the financial accounts (subcategory Bank 
deposits, Bundesbank database, series EU4678) amounted to 319.3 billion euros from 2007 to 2010 and were 
thus practically as high as the difference in the Bundesbank’s Target claims between the end of 2010 and the end 
of 2006, namely 320.2 billion euros.  
6 The Target liabilities also include 21 billion euros in net debts of the ECB. They are the counterpart to claims 
of the NCBs on the ECB, which were acknowledged in the exchange against securities that were acquired by 
these NCBs on account of the ECB and that were transferred to the latter. See European Central Bank, Annual 
Report 2010, Frankfurt 2010. 7 
 
Figure 2: Net claims of the NCBs resulting from transactions within the Eurosystem 
(TARGET) 
 
Sources: Germany: Bundesbank database, series EU8148 (See Footnote 5); Spain: Monthly Balance Sheet of the 
Banco de España; remaining countries: IMF, International Financial Statistics (Target claims = Net claims on 
the Eurosystem less the intra-Eurosystem claims related to the issuance of bank notes); calculations by the 
authors.  
   
  The volume of credit granted by Germany (and the other countries with positive 
Target balances) to the GIPS through the Target system far exceeds the official loans given to 
the afflicted countries by the EU member countries. Greece received, until May 2011, 38 
billion euros under the Greek Loan Facility agreed to in April 2010; Ireland so far has 
received 11.7 billion euros within the framework of the European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Even if all the credit 
available were paid out, which amounts to 172 billion euros including the financial assistance 
agreed for Portugal in May 2011, the rescue facilities agreed to officially by the community 
would be only half as large as the credit given through the central banks’ payment system. 8 
 
The Bundesbank Statements  
 
After H.-W. Sinn brought the  Target imbalances to public attention with articles in the 
German papers Wirtschaftswoche, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
pointing out the risks they involved,
7 the Bundesbank reacted with various, nearly identical 
statements. One day after the first publication by H.-W. Sinn on 21 February 2011, while 
confirming the figure calculated by the Ifo Institute of 326 billion euros in net claims of the 
Bundesbank to the end of 2010,
8 it tried to play down the importance of the issue in its press 
release and other statements. In essence, it said:
9 
                                                   
7 See  H.-W. Sinn, “Neue  Abgründe”,  Wirtschaftswoche, No. 8, 21 February 2011, p. 35, published also in 
German and English as, same author, “Abgründe”, ifo-Standpunkt  No. 122, 29 March 2011, and “Deep 
Chasms”, ifo Viewpoint No. 122, 29 March 2011. A number of editorials were published subsequently alluding 
to these columns: K. Handschuch, “Versteckte Krisenhilfe”,  Wirtschaftswoche, No. 8, 21 February 2011, p. 8; 
H. Krumrey, “Am Bundestag vorbei”, Wirtschaftswoche, No. 9, 28 February 2011, p. 26; and M. Fischer, 
“Große Summen”, Wirtschaftswoche, No. 9, 28 February 2011, p. 26. One day after the international publication 
of the translation into English of the Wirtschaftswoche article of 21 February as an ifo Viewpoint, a similar 
statement was published by J. Whittaker, “Intra-eurosystem Debt”, Lancaster University  Management School, 
30 March 2011. The Joint Forecast of the German Economics Institutes made a short mention of the issue, 
without going into detail: Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, “Aufschwung setzt sich fort – Europäische 
Schuldenkrise noch ungelöst”, ifo Schnelldienst, 64 (8),  20 April 2011, p. 50. Two earlier articles by a Deutsche 
Bank official dealing with the Target issue were made available to us by Thomas Mayer, Chief Economist at the 
Deutsche Bank, on 9 May 2011: P. M. Garber, “Notes on the Role of Target in a Stage III Crisis”, NBER 
Working Paper  6619, June 1989, analysed the protecting function of the Target system against possible 
speculative attacks during the transition from the virtual (1999) to the physical (2002) introduction of the euro. 
Furthermore, there is another text by the Deutsche Bank, to the best of our knowledge an internal paper that has 
not been published, P. M. Garber, “The Mechanics of Intra Euro Capital Flight”, Deutsche Bank, Economics 
Special Report, 10 December 2010, in which the problems associated with the Target system were addressed 
very clearly. An early warning of internal imbalances in the euro zone was expressed by K. Reeh, 
“Zahlungsbilanzausgleich in der Währungsunion. Viele Frage, aber noch keine Antworten,” in H.-J. Stagermann 
and O. Steiger, eds, Herausforderung der Geldwirtschaft, Metropolis Verlag 1999, pp. 295 – 328; same author, 
“Das Eurosystem: Von einem Behörden- zu einem Bankensystem? ”,  in H. Schmidt, E. Ketzel, and S. Prigge, 
eds, Wolfgang Stützel – moderne Konzepte für Finanzmärkte, Beschäftigung und Wirtschaftsverfassung, Mohr 
Siebeck 2001, p. 333 – 349. In H.-W. Sinn, “Tickende Zeitbombe”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, No. 77, 2 April 2011, 
p. 24, a figure was named for the risk for Germany represented by the Target imbalances and by other rescue 
systems of the euro countries and the IMF. An editorial comment on it was written by M. Beise, “Die Wahrheit 
über den Euro”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, No. 83, 9 April 2011, p.  23. In H.-W. Sinn,  “Die riskante 
Kreditersatzpolitik der EZB”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 103, 4 May 2011, p. 10, as well as, same 
author, “Target-Salden, Außenhandel und Geldschöpfung”, ifo Schnelldienst 64(9), 2011, the payment procedure 
was first  interpreted in the context of current account imbalances. See also same author,  “Die heimlichen 
Kredite”, Handelsblatt, No. 88, 6/7 May 2011, p. 72, also published as “The ECB’s Secret Bailout Strategy”, 
Project Syndicate, April 2011. Much attention attracted, same author, “The ECB’s Stealth Bailout”, VOX, 1 June 
2011, www.voxeu.org.index.php?q=node/6599, as well as an article in the Financial Times commenting on a 
lecture given by H.-W. Sinn on 19 May 2011 at the Munich Economic Summit. See M. Wolf, “Intolerable 
Choices for the Eurozone”, Financial Times, No. 37,632, 1 June 2011, p. 9. An extended version of the VOX 
article in German was published as H.-W. Sinn, “Das unsichtbare Bail-out der EZB”, Ökonomenstimme, 11 June 
2011,  http://www.oekonomenstimme.org/artikel/2011/06/das-unsichtbare-bail-out-der-ezb/.  In, same author, 
“Eine Einladung zur Selbstbedienung”, Handelsblatt, 14 June 2011, p. 9, as well as in, same author, “On and off 
Target”, VOX, 14 June 2011, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6644, an attempt was made to clear some 
misperceptions and wrong interpretations on the issue that have been widely publicised on the Internet. Further 
literature will be cited later on in this paper.  
8  H.-W. Sinn, “Neue Abgründe”, Wirtschaftswoche, op.  cit.; German Bundesbank, “TARGET2-Salden der 
Bundesbank”, Bundesbank press release  of  22 February 2011. (On its website, the Bundesbank press office had 
misdated this press release at least until these lines were written, to 21 January 2011, i.e. one month before 
Sinn’s article  was published in Wirtschaftswoche). 
9 German Bundesbank, “TARGET2-Salden der Bundesbank”, press release of 22 February 2011, and German 
Bundesbank, “The dynamics of the Bundesbank’s TARGET2 balance”, Monthly Report 63 (3), 2011, p. 34. 9 
 
1.  The Target balances are of no consequence, since they net each other out within the 
euro zone.  
2.  Germany’s risk does not reside in the Bundesbank’s claims, but in the liabilities of the 
GIPS countries. Germany is liable only in proportion to its share in the ECB, and if it 
had been other countries instead of Germany that had accumulated Target claims, 
Germany would be liable for exactly the same amount.  
3.   The balances do not represent any risks  in addition to those arising from the 
refinancing operations.  
  Point 1 is correct, but irrelevant. In the case of the official loans given by the euro 
countries to Greece (the Greek Loan Facility) the balances also net out within the euro zone, 
but that does not make the creditor countries feel any more at ease. 
  Point 2 is correct. Indeed, Germany has a claim on the Eurosystem, and the 
Eurosystem one on the NCBs of the GIPS countries. Should the latter default and the 
collateral that they committed for the refinancing credit they obtained, which is made up 
mostly of government bonds, lose its value, Germany would be liable in proportion to its 
capital share in the ECB, namely about 33% of the 340 billion euros in GIPS liabilities, i.e. 
around 114 billion euros. This was the figure calculated and published by one of us on 2 
April.
10 No speculation regarding the likelihood of such a scenario was made. We consider it 
small. The  issue is the value-at-risk. 
  The Bundesbank’s claims themselves would be directly exposed in the case of a 
demise of the euro, something that has been considered by Anglo-Saxon economists as 
possible if not probable,
11 inasmuch as it cannot be taken for granted that the former members 
of the euro community would choose to honour their Target debts in such a case. Legally, this 
is a grey area. It cannot be ruled out that Germany in this scenario would have to write off its 
currently more than  320 billion in euro claims.  
  We consider this scenario neither probable nor desirable. For many reasons, we are 
convinced that the euro is indispensable for furthering Europe’s economic and overall 
integration. We hope that the current difficulties are just part of the new currency’s teething 
problems, and that Europe can master the challenges they pose. But this also involves 
achieving complete clarity on the nature of the Target problem. 
  The statement made in point 3 is, in a strict sense, correct, but it obscures more than it 
illuminates the problem, hiding the fact that the Target balances measure deficits in the intra-
euro balances of payments. It is true that the Target imbalances arise essentially through the 
Eurosystem’s normal refinancing operations, if we neglect the ELA loans that some NCBs 
                                                                                                                                                               
German Bundesbank, letter to the Ifo Institute of 18 March 2011. Similarly, S. Ruhkamp, “Misstrauen lähmt den 
Geldverkehr”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 92, 19 April 2011, p. 11. 
10 See H.-W. Sinn, “Tickende Zeitbombe”, op. cit. 33% of Germany’s 326 billion claims would amount to 108 
billion euros.  
11  P. Krugman, “The Euro Trap”, New York Times, 29 April 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/opinion/30krugman.html?ref=paulkrugman; M. Feldstein, “The Political 
Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability”, The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4), 1997, p. 23-42; M. Friedman, “Why Europe Can't Afford the Euro – The 
Danger of a Common Currency”, The Times, 19 November 1997; same author, “Auf Kosten Dritter”, Capital, Heft 
12, 11 July 2002, p. 18. Friedman says there: “Der Euro wird in 5 bis 15 Jahren auseinanderbrechen.” (“The euro 
will collapse in 5 to 15 years”). See also, same author, “Ich sage, der Euro wird bald wieder auseinanderbrechen” 
(“I say that the euro will break up soon”), Die Presse, 12 December 1997, p. 23.  10 
 
granted of their own accord against little collateral. But they do reflect an additional granting 
of credit that goes far beyond a country’s normal stock of money balances, that has a fiscal 
character and that would not have been possible at the central bank’s refinancing rate under 
the conditions imposed by the US monetary system. This point will be elucidated below. 
 
What are the Target Balances? 
 
TARGET is a catchy term with several meanings that are not all connected with each other at 
first glance.  
1.  The term TARGET is an acronym that stands for Trans-European Automated Real-
Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer.  This refers to the European transaction 
settlement system through which the commercial banks of one country make payments 
to the commercial banks of another country. 
2.  Target balances are claims and liabilities of the individual central banks of the euro 
area vis-à-vis the European central bank system that are booked as such in the 
balances of the NCBs.   
3.  Target balances measure deficits and surpluses in the single euro countries’ balances 
of payments with other euro countries. Target liabilities are the portion of the original 
central bank money created by a given NCB that exceeds the stock of central bank 
money available in that  NCB’s    jurisdiction  and that was employed for the net 
acquisition of goods and assets from other euro countries. Correspondingly, Target 
claims measure the surplus  of the stock of central bank money circulating in one 
country above the original central bank money created there, which arose from the net 
sale of goods and assets to other euro countries.
12 
 
  From an economic point of view, the third definition is particularly relevant for an 
assessment of the Target balances, because it shows that the Target balances measure intra-
euro balance of payments  problems.    The designation “original”  in the third definition  is 
applied to the stock of central bank money created in a country via an NCB’s foreign currency 
purchases, gold purchases and refinancing operations, as opposed to the “secondary” stock of 
central bank money that arises in the process of settling transactions within the framework of 
the Target system. The term “assets” refers to everything that is usually grouped under private 
and public capital transactions, i.e. stocks, bonds, real estate, enterprises, but above all claims 
of all types such as deposits, bonds or bills of exchange. This does not include the Target 
claims themselves. 
  Central bank money is the term for the money that the commercial banks hold in their 
accounts at the respective national central banks and cash that they have on hand for the cash 
withdrawals of their customers or that is in circulation among the customers or generally 
among the private non-banks. Since Keynes, the term M0 is generally used here. 
                                                   
12 To the best of our knowledge these definitions were used for the first time in: H.-W. Sinn, “Die riskante 
Kreditersatzpolitik der EZB”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 103, 4 May 2011, p. 10. In addition to the 
stock of money balances drained to other countries, the liabilities also include interest on earlier outflows.  11 
 
Alternatively, economists refer to the “monetary base”. In addition to the “monetary base” 
there is also deposit money that the commercial banks create in proportion to the monetary 
base via the granting of loans and that they make available to their customers as deposits. 
When the terms money, money demand and money supply are used in this article, we always 
mean central bank money without further specification. The relationship of deposits to the 
money base is usually relatively constant since it mainly results from the obligation of the 
commercial banks to keep a specified portion of their deposits as minimum reserves in their 
accounts at the respective NCBs. In times of crisis, however,  when bank failures or even 
currency union exits are feared, this relationship can weaken. 
  We emphasise that all data we employ is from the official statistics and that we regard 
the national stock of money balances that is booked to the respective NBC balance sheet as 
the actual stock of money circulating in a country. To our knowledge there are no data on 
international cash circulation outside of the banking system. Nobody knows how many 
suitcases full of cash cross the borders surreptitiously. Since there are no restrictions on 
international bank transfers in Europe but there is an obligation to declare larger cash 
transports, we presume that this portion was rather insignificant in the time window we have 
examined. 
  In order to understand how the various Target definitions are related, it is necessary to 
understand how the payment transactions between banks are carried out. When a bank 
customer effects a transfer from one commercial bank to another, it is fundamentally central 
bank money that  flows between the commercial  banks. If a Greek purchaser of a good 
transfers money from his checking account to the checking account of a vendor at another 
Greek commercial bank, money is debited from the central-bank account of his bank and 
credited to the central-bank account of the vendor’s bank. The bank that pays out in turn 
charges the checking account of the customer, and the recipient bank credits the amount of 
payment to the checking account of the vendor. 
  If the bank of the vendor is in another euro country, Germany for example, the 
procedure is similar, only that now the payment flows via the Target system of the ECB. 
When the Greek central bank debits the account that the commercial bank of the Greek 
customer has with it, it takes money out of the Greek economy and destroys it. The 
Bundesbank instead creates new money and credits it to the account of the vendor’s 
commercial bank. In exchange the Greek NBC is debited a liability to the ECB, and the 
Bundesbank is credited a claim against the ECB. 
  Since the payments between the countries flow in both directions, they normally net 
themselves largely out as regards the Target balances booked in the balance sheets of their 
NCB at the end of the year, This is also the case when a country has net imports of goods and 
in exchange exports a net amount of assets, or simply takes on a loan, which can be 
interpreted as the “sale” of a certificate of debt.  What is booked then are only the outstanding 
balances, which are added annually  to the balances and the corresponding interest 
accumulated from the previous years.  
  When the Target system was established, it was assumed that the balances would be 
insignificant. As insiders have reported, the belief prevailed at the time that the balances 
would virtually net out daily, and it was thus not considered necessary to put a cap on them. 
They were to have the character of short-term checking account credits to smooth out the 
peaks in monetary transactions. And in actual fact, the balances were very small, as Figure 2 
shows, up to the outbreak of the financial crisis in summer 2007. Dramatic developments 
occurred only thereafter. 12 
 
  When the euro system started to operate, only large amounts were channelled via the 
payment system of the ECB. In addition to TARGET, the banks of the respective national 
countries had their own, private payment systems through which most payments were 
executed and netted out. Since payments from country A to country B are mostly offset by 
payments of country B to country A, the Target system of the ECB was in fact only needed to 
smooth out the peaks between the private payment systems. This changed, however, with the 
establishment of the TARGET2 system in 2007. Since then, smaller payments are also 
increasingly carried out directly via the Target accounts of the ECB. Recently, two-thirds of 
the Target transactions had a volume of less than 50,000 euros, and the median value of the 
payments was only 10,000 euros.
13 This alteration did have a considerable influence on the 
transaction volume of the Target system, but the balances now booked there annually were 
not affected. From the very beginning, they included the net deficits and net surpluses in the 
money transfers between the banks of the individual euro countries. As a result, a consistent 
interpretation of the time series, as shown for example in Figure 2, is possible, and the rise of 
the Target balances shown in the figure since 2007 is not a statistical fluke. 
  An example of a payment transaction in which a Target balance arises is shown in 
Figure 3. A Greek transportation company buys a German truck. With the bank transfer the 
money flows to the Greek central bank and ceases to circulate in Greece; i.e. it is destroyed 
there. Conversely, the Bundesbank must carry out the transfer and to do this it creates new 
money that flows to the manufacturer via its commercial bank. A Target liability is assigned 
to the Greek central bank on  the amount of the transfer request vis-à-vis the ECB, and 
conversely the Bundesbank receives a Target claim on the ECB.  
  In the booking of the payment transactions it does not matter what the Greek company 
buys in Germany. Instead of a truck it could also be a German asset, for example a plot of 
land, a company, bonds or some security. Also the mere opening of a German bank account 
onto which a Greek national wishes to transfer his money because he distrusts his own banks 
leads basically to the same payment transaction. 
Figure 3: The origin of the Target balances (example) 
 
 
Source: Own depiction. 
                                                   
13 European Central Bank, Target Annual Report 2010, Frankfurt 2010; European Central Bank, The Payment 
System – Payments, Securities and Derivatives, and the Role of the Eurosystem, Frankfurt 2010.  13 
 
  It lies in the nature of the transfer procedure that the Target balances are not merely 
balance-sheet clearing items but actual claims and liabilities with loan characteristics and that 
accrue interest. On the one side of the transaction, the Bundesbank had to create money 
without receiving a claim, as is usually the case, against a German commercial bank. On the 
other side of the transaction, the Greek central bank destroyed the money without its claims 
on the Greek banking system becoming any smaller. The Target debt vis-à-vis the ECB is the 
counterpart of the missing claim reduction. 
  An even clearer picture emerges if one looks directly at the balances of the NCBs as 
schematised in Figure 4 (with unrealistic numbers).
14 Basically, in the balance sheet of an 
NCB, the gold and foreign currency reserves as well as the loans granted to the commercial 
banks are on the left-hand side among the assets, while the money it has created is on the 
right-hand side among the liabilities. Usually central bank money is further divided into cash 
and deposits of the commercial banks at the NCB, but this is not relevant here. Both forms of 
money combine into the above-mentioned monetary base (M0). In the schematic balances it is 
assumed that the gold and foreign currency reserves of the Greek central bank amount to 5 
monetary units and that in addition it loaned 15 units to the commercial banks. Since gold and 
foreign currency were acquired in return for self-created euros, the monetary base equals 20. 
The same holds for the Bundesbank, only all numbers in the example are assumed to be ten 
times larger. 
Figure 4: The Target balances in the balance sheets of the central banks (example) 
 
 
Source: Own depiction. 
 
  Let us now look at the possible payment transactions starting with the portion above 
the lower of the two dashed lines. We will examine the portion below this in the next section. 
If a monetary unit is transferred from Greece to Germany, the monetary base in Greece 
decreases  by this unit and it increases correspondingly in Germany. The changes of the 
balance-sheet item are displayed in red in the schematic drawing. Since the Greek balance 
contracts and the German balance lengthens, the Target balances are booked as clearing items, 
                                                   
14 For the structure of the central bank balance sheets, see J. Hawkins, “Central Bank Balance Sheets and Fiscal 
Operations,” BIS Paper 4, 2010. For a similar depiction of the posting operations, see P. M. Garber, “Notes on 
the Role of Target in a Stage III Crisis”, op. cit. 
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i.e. as a liability of the Greek central bank and as a claim of the Bundesbank, in both cases 
vis-à-vis the ECB. 
  The correctness of booking the Target balances as claims and liabilities follows 
however not only from some kind of booking mechanism, but from an economic perspective 
primarily from the fact that economic goods have moved from one country to another – in the 
above example a truck – without a movement of another good or asset in return. The claim 
that Germany receives through its Bundesbank on the ECB and that the latter has on the 
Greek NCB is the compensating instrument in the example.   
  In actual fact the Target balances arise initially directly   between the participating 
central banks. There is however an agreement, as the Bundesbank has reported, presumably 
between the individual central banks, whereby at the end of the business day the balances are 
transformed into claims and liabilities vis-à-vis the Eurosystem as a whole. This procedure 
corresponds to the joint liability for losses on Target loans, as pointed out in Section 2.
15 As 
we will explain below, with this  the central bank system has virtually created a kind of 
Eurobond.   
  Basically, the Target balances arise from transfer transactions as described above. It 
must be kept in mind, however, that stocks and not flows are depicted in the balance sheets. 
As already mentioned, the balances of each year are carried forward, interest applied and 
added together. Thus, the balances listed in the balance sheets measure the balance of 
payment deficits and the balance of payment surpluses, or the monetary outflows and inflows 
between the euro countries, that have accumulated since the introduction of the euro, 




   
The payment procedure described in the example that leads to the formation of the Target 
balances apparently shifts the monetary base, taken by itself, from Greece to Germany. If that 
had been the main element behind the accumulation of Target balances shown in Figure 2, 
then the monetary base of the GIPS countries should have disappeared long ago. At the 
beginning of 2007, before the Target balances had started to rise, their monetary base was 
only 158 billion euros, whereas by March 2011 their Target liabilities to the rest of the 
Eurosystem had increased to 314 billion euros. In truth the monetary base of the GIPS 
countries has not changed appreciably since the beginning of the crisis and during the 
accumulation of the Target balances; it even increased somewhat, from 158 billion euros to 
181 billion euros. This is shown in Figure 5 below. 
   
                                                   
15 Bundesbank, “ The dynamics of the Bundesbank’s TARGET2 balance”, op. cit. 15 
 





Note: The monetary base was calculated as the sum of the actual bank notes placed in circulation by the NCBs, 
the deposits of the commercial banks on their accounts at their NCB (including minimum reserves) and the 
deposit facility. The banknotes that are actually put in circulation by the NCBs consist of the “statutory” 
banknote circulation calculated according to the NCB’s  capital share in the ECB and the intra-Eurosystem 
liabilities from the issuance of banknotes. The refinancing loans comprise the main refinancing operations, the 
longer-term refinancing operations, the marginal lending facility and other liquidity-providing operations. The 
ELA credits are emergency loans (Emergency Liquidity Assistance) of the Irish central bank. Gold and foreign 
currency (including other net claims) contain, in addition to stocks of gold and foreign currency, also the balance 
of the remaining assets and liabilities that are listed in the balance sheets of the NCBs. On the asset side this 
includes, for example, the securities of residents in the euro area that were not acquired within the framework of 
the normal refinancing operations. On the liability side, we have above all the capital and the reserves of the 
NCBs and liabilities in foreign currency. In the case of the GIPS countries, there is a net claim amounting to an 
average of 75 billion euros in the period depicted. 
Sources: Refinancing operations, deposits of the commercial banks, deposit facilities, banknote circulation, intra-
Eurosystem claims related to the issuance of banknotes: Liquidity statistics or monthly balance-sheet statements 
of the NCBs; emergency loans of the Central Bank of Ireland (ELA): monthly balance sheet, other assets; gold 
and foreign currency: Eurostat, Official Foreign Reserves including Gold; Target claims: see Fig. 2; calculations 
by the authors. 
   
  The money flowing out of the GIPS countries via payment transactions was thus 
completely offset by the creation of new money. In principle, new money can arise from gold 
and foreign currency purchases and from credits of the central bank to the commercial banks 
(refinancing operations and ELA). It is evident in the chart, however, that the increase of the 
gold and foreign currency stocks of the GIPS countries only made a small contribution here. 
The lion’s share of the additional money creation apparently came about as the result of loans 
granted by the central banks. Stated the other way around, in the period under observation the 
NCBs of the GIPS countries issued a huge amount of new money through credits, which 16 
 
primarily flowed abroad as it was used for the purchase of foreign goods and assets. Only a 
small portion of this money remained at home as part of the monetary base. 
  The share of the credit-created central bank money that remained at home is only one 
tenth (36 billion euros). Nine-tenths (314 billion euros) is circulating abroad.  
  Relative to the monetary base originating from the GIPS (495 billion euros), the 
money circulating abroad is 63%. This is reminiscent of the proportion of dollars circulating 
outside the US, which at the end of 2001 was estimated to be somewhat more than half of the 
monetary base
16. It is  significantly more than the share of deutschmark circulating outside 
Germany in the mid-1990s, which was somewhat less than a third of the monetary base.
17 
  In March 2011 the monetary stock in the euro zone that originally arose as the result of 
loans issued by the NCBs of the GIPS countries amounted to 350 billion euros. This is 66% of 
the total credit-financed monetary base of the euro system, which amounts to 529 billion 
euros, although these countries only account for 18% of euro-zone GDP. 
  This has given rise to the unusual situation that now prevails in the euro area. The 
monetary base in the GIPS countries, as is usual in closed currency areas, consists of one 
component that arose from gold and foreign currency purchases, and another that resulted 
from loans of the central bank to the commercial banks. However, in other euro countries, 
particularly Germany (see Figure 1) there is in addition secondarily created money that 
flowed in via the Target accounts. The central banks of these countries had to create this 
money because they had to fulfil the transfer orders. Above, we designated the first two 
components of the monetary base as the “original” monetary base and the third as the 
“secondary” monetary base. 
The reason for the excessive credit and money creation in the GIPS was obviously the 
financial crisis. Under the euro regime, and also as a result in part of an overly weak banking 
regulation, capital flowed for years without hesitation to the southern and western periphery 
of the euro area, triggering an inflationary boom in the GIPS countries.
18 But the flow of 
capital ran dry, and even partly reversed itself, when the American financial crisis prompted 
investors there and in Europe to revise their risk assessment.
19 Market interest rates for the 
GIPS rose because investors demanded high risk premiums  compared to safe German 
government bonds. In this situation, the possibility for the GIPS banks of getting credit at low 
interest rates from their respective NCB became much too inviting. It saved the GIPS the need 
to take measures to recapitalise their banks. The ECB itself encouraged borrowing by 
reducing its main refinancing rate from 4.25% in October 2008 to just one percent in May 
                                                   
16 United States Treasury Department, “The Use and Counterfeiting of United States Currency Abroad, Part 2”, 
March 2003. 
17 F. Seitz, “Der DM-Umlauf im Ausland”, German Bundesbank Diskussionspapier 1/95, 1995; see also H.-W. 
Sinn and H. Feist, “Eurowinners and Eurolosers: The Distribution of Seignorage Wealth in EMU”, European 
Journal of Political Economy 13, 1997, pp. 665-689. To be sure, the difference is that the monetary creation gain 
(seignorage) in the form of interest yields on the newly created and loaned money  is socialised in the 
Eurosystem, while in the case of currency circulating outside the jurisdiction of the note-issuing central bank a 
regular income in the form of interest yield on the externally circulating currency remains at that bank. 
18 See H.-W. Sinn, T. Buchen und T. Wollmershäuser, “Trade Imbalances – Causes, Consequences and Policy 
Measures: Ifo’s Statement for the Camdessus Commission”, CESifo Forum 12 (1), 2011, p. 47-58; H.-W. Sinn, 
“Rescuing Europe”, CESifo Forum Special Issue, August 2010; European Economic Advisory Group, “A New 
Crisis Mechanism for the Euro Area”, in: European Economic Advisory Group, The EEAG Report on the 
European Economy, CESifo, Munich 2011, Chapter 2, p. 71–96.  
19 See C. Klepsch and T. Wollmershäuser, “Yield Spreads on EMU Government Bonds – How the Financial 
Crisis Has Helped Investors to Rediscover Risk”, Intereconomics / Review of European Economic Policy 46(3), 
2011, p. 169-176. 17 
 
2009, and adopting a full-allotment policy as early as October 2008. Full allotment means that 
the ECB was willing to grant the commercial banks credit in any amount they wished with 
maturities of up to one year. In addition, the ECB successively reduced its quality 
requirements on the collateral that the banks had to commit against their borrowing, and 
successively extended the deadline for returning to normal collateral requirements.  
  Taking this into consideration, the example of the Greek buyer of a truck must be 
modified. He obviously does not pay for his truck with money he possesses, but he borrows it 
from his bank, and the bank, because of the difficulties of raising funds in the interbank 
market, borrows it from its NCB. The Greek NCB thus creates the money that the haulage 
firm needs for the transfer to Germany. The related, now expanded, payment process is shown 
in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Credit creation and Target balances (example) 
  
 
Source: Own depiction. 
 
  In Greece, money is now created, lent, destroyed when transferred via the Target 
system, and then created anew in Germany by the Bundesbank, which transfers it to the 
account of the commercial bank of the truck producer. In comparison to Figure 3 the chain of 
claims between the central banks and the ECB is extended by the claim of the Greek central 
bank against the commercial bank, which in turn has a claim against the transportation firm. 
  But this does not end the payment processes, as the commercial banks of the exporting 
country, in our example Germany, and their private customers really do not need the 
additional money that they receive through the transfer. To be sure, a company  needs the 
money in the sense of a unit of account and a claim on economic resources, but no one needs 
the extra liquidity for their daily transactions that the incoming money provides. Banks do not 
hold excess liquidity, because it involves interest costs, and their customers also try to keep 
their liquidity low in order to save on interest costs. That is why the German commercial 
banks will only borrow a correspondingly lower amount of central bank money from the 
Bundesbank when money flows in through the international Target payment system. The 
stock of credit-created original central bank money is crowded out by secondary central bank 18 
 
money created by the Bundesbank by way of carrying out the international transaction and for 
which it receives a Target claim, as explained above. The decline of Bundesbank loans to the 
commercial banks is shown by the dashed arrows in the lower part of Figure 6. Overall, there 
is a relocation of central bank loans from Germany to Greece, without a concurrent change in 
the monetary base either in Greece or Germany. 
   In the system of accounts shown in Figure 3, the credit shift implies a lengthening of 
the Greek central bank’s balance sheet and a reduction of the Bundesbank’s balance sheet, as 
shown below the dashed line. In Greece, the central bank lends the banks an additional unit of 
money, and in Germany, the Bundesbank lends one unit less. Once again, the monetary base 
in both countries remains unchanged, but the credit given by the Bundesbank declines by one 
unit, while it rises by one unit at the Greek central bank. 
  The shift of central bank credit from Germany to the GIPS has been wildly 
misunderstood in the public discussion triggered by our various publications. In particular, it 
has been alleged that this statement was based on the implicit assumption that the ECB, 
instead of pursuing a full-allotment policy, limits the money supply, which of course it does 
not do.
20 Such an implicit assumption was never made. It is not the money supply that is 
limited, but the demand for money. At a given interest rate, there is a natural limit to money 
demand which is determined by the economic activity and the payment habits prevailing in 
the country, and this is the reason for the retrenchment, which we described as crowding out, 
of central bank credit. 
 
Figure 7: Non-GIPS  money demand, full allotment, and the crowding out of central bank 
credit  
 
Source: Own depiction. 
  Figure 7 provides a theoretical depiction of this relationship, in which the demand for 
central bank money is presented as a declining function of the interest rate, where other 
determinants like GDP or payment habits are assumed as given. The lower the interest rate, the 
higher the money demand, as the interest rate measures the opportunity cost of holding money. 
The demand for money may be understood best as the stock of central bank money that banks 
                                                   
20 See the Reply to the Critics in the Appendix.  19 
 
hold as liquidity and minimum reserves and which private non-banks keep on average for 
normal payment processes. Not meant is the demand for credit that represents the desire for 
enjoying economic resources in advance that forces someone else to forego consumption or 
investment. It is truly money in the sense of a non-interest-bearing asset held by banks and their 
customers in addition to stocks, securities or real assets, instead of exchanging it for goods or 
interest-bearing assets because it provides liquidity services and facilitates transactions. 
  Let us assume that the ECB follows a full-allotment policy. The banks, and indirectly 
the other economic agents supplied by them, may borrow as much central bank money as they 
wish to. But at the given refinancing rate they only want to realise point A and therefore 
demand only the amount of money that is shown horizontally below it. The position of point 
A is not constant: over the course of time it moves to the right with the money demand curve 
when there is real economic growth and inflation. It may also move to the right in times of 
crisis, when asset owners distrust other forms of investment. Still, given all the other 
determinants and given the interest rate, point A occupies only a given position.  
  If as a result of the payments flowing via the Target system the NCB is forced to 
deliver new money to the banks outside the refinancing operations, i.e. to create secondary 
money, this automatically reduces the original monetary base generated through refinancing 
operations. After all, the size of the stock of money desired, at least in the case of banks and 
firms, does not depend essentially on whether they borrow money to carry it in their pockets 
or forgo lending the money they already have. As the stocks of gold and foreign currency are 
determined by the policies of the central banks, the inflow of money from abroad in fact 
displaces the central bank credit. It declines in about the same amount as flows in via transfers 
from abroad.  
  In view of these findings, it is not surprising that the German commercial banks have 
lately taken almost no refinancing loans from the Bundesbank. The Deutsche Bank, for 
instance, has not participated for months in refinancing operations, since it has enough 
liquidity as a result of the payments of its customers flowing in from abroad. That is the 
mechanism through which the crowding out of refinancing credit occurs. 
  The situation would not be much different if the ECB controlled the money supply, as 
it did before the outbreak of the financial crisis by way of variable-rate tenders, as used to be 
standard at the Bundesbank, and as would the case approximately be if the ECB were to 
intervene secretly in order to prevent an excessive expansion of the monetary base. In that 
case the monetary base would not be affected by the inflow via the Target accounts, and the 
central bank credit would also be crowded out as a result. In a certain sense this is the trivial 
case. But it is not the case that we assume or that was assumed by H.-W. Sinn in his earlier 
writings.
21 
  This process is not only theoretically to be expected; it also agrees with the facts, as 
shown in the two following figures. Figure 8 shows the evolution of the euro zone’s monetary 
base. It is obvious that the stock of money balances grew excessively during the financial 
crisis: In 2009, the year of the crisis, the demand for money evidently increased because some 
commercial banks, fearing a continuation of the crisis, preferred to exchange short-term 
claims on other banks for claims on the ECB, i.e. into central bank money including the 
deposit facilities (which are part of the monetary base). In the meantime this stage of the crisis 
has passed and the demand for money again follows the trend. The massive shift of the stock 
                                                   
21  That this would be a misinterpretation was already discussed in: H.-W.  Sinn,  “Eine Einladung zur 
Selbstbedienung”,  op. cit., as well as in: H-W. Sinn, “On and off Target”, VOX, 14 June 2011, 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6644.  20 
 
of central bank money across European borders, as measured by the Target balances, is not 
reflected in the growth of the money aggregate. It may be assumed, therefore, that in a 
comparison of scenarios at present with and without Target balances, no effect of the massive 
money inflows from abroad on the monetary base of the money-receiving countries would be 
visible. Since, furthermore, the share of the monetary base created by the acquisition of gold 
and foreign exchange has hardly changed, a nearly complete crowding out of central bank 
credit by the money inflows can be observed.  
  A similar statement is also true for Germany, as the figure shows. The German 
monetary base is again following its trend despite the massive money inflows via the Target 
system. This contradicts the frequently heard presumption that the inflow of money via the 
Target system had on balance led to an expansion of the monetary base in Germany.
22 
 
Figure 8: Monetary base in the euro zone 
 
Sources: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse, Economic Concepts, Monetary Operations, 
Minimum Reserves and Liquidity; German Bundesbank database, EMU, Monetary aggregates, Overall monetary 
survey in the euro area, Banking system’s liquidity position, series AU1735. 
 
  The composition of the monetary base hardly changed  during the period under 
consideration. This applies to the distribution among the country groups as well as to the 
breakdown of the euro monetary base into the origins of its components. This is shown in 
Figure 9, where the entire euro monetary base is set equal to one hundred per cent. The thick 
green line, which starts at 20% on the left-hand side, is the borderline between the monetary 
base of the GIPS countries (measured from below) and the monetary base of the remaining 
euro countries (measured from above). It can be seen that in the years in which the Target 
balances were built up, the proportions of the monetary base held in the GIPS countries and 
the rest of the euro area hardly changed. The share of the GIPS countries declined only 
marginally, from 20% to 17%, a proportion in line with their share in the euro-zone GDP, 
which most recently amounted to 18%, as mentioned earlier. The shares of the GIPS countries 
                                                   
22 See for instance Th. Mayer, “Mit Wunderkräutern gegen die Blinddarmentzündung”, Handelsblatt, 15 June 
2010, p. 9. 21 
 
and the other countries in the stocks of gold and foreign exchange, represented by the gold-
coloured areas, also fail to show a trend.  
 




Note: The Target balance corresponds to the Target liabilities of the GIPS NCBs to the Eurosystem as well as the 
Target claims of the remaining countries’ NCBs (including the ECB) on the Eurosystem. It measures the central 
bank money that flowed from the GIPS to the other countries of the euro area via international transactions..  
Sources: See Fig. 5; calculations by the authors. 
  The changes in the composition of the credit distribution across countries were 
gigantic, however. While the total share of central bank credit fell slightly (at the start of 2007 
it amounted to 56% of the entire monetary base, and in March 2011 to 50%),
23 the share of 
the GIPS rose from 13% to 66% during the same period. This increase was caused almost 
exclusively by the Target credits, which surged from zero to 59% of total credit. Since, at the 
same time, the entire monetary base of the euro zone stayed nearly on trend, as explained in 
Figure 8 above, the central bank credit of the non-GIPS countries was crowded out in the full 
amount of the Target credits.  
                                                   
23 This decline of the share of central bank credit in the entire monetary base in the euro zone is primarily due to 
the Covered Bonds Purchase Program, which had a volume of 60 billion euros and thus amounted to almost 6% 
of the monetary base. This program is reflected in Figure 9 in an expansion of the gold-coloured areas, entailing 
thus a decline in the share of central bank credit. Purchases of government bonds within the Securities Markets 
Program, amounting at present to 74 billion euros, have no effect on the gold-coloured areas, as their effect on 
the monetary base is neutralised by the acquisition of time deposits in the same volume.  22 
 
  The fact that the central banks of the other countries, especially the Bundesbank, were 
given Target claims against the ECB was presented to us in an exchange with an Irish 
colleague as the conscious investment preference of the Bundesbank. While other central 
banks held their assets created by money creation in the form of gold or claims against the 
commercial banking system, it was supposedly the preference of the Bundesbank to build up 
claims against other central banks instead. This assessment of things does not do justice to the 
facts, however. As explained above, the Bundesbank was not able to refuse the transfer 
demands and to resist the creation of new money outside the refinancing operations with 
commercial banks.  For this reaction it automatically received claims on the Eurosystem. 
There was no conscious investment decision at all. 
  Figure 9 shows only the crowding out of credit between the GIPS and the other euro 
countries as a group. The distribution among the individual countries is shown in Figure 10, 
where the Eurosystem’s total central bank credit is set equal to one hundred per cent, and the 
coloured areas show the shares of the individual countries in this total without a distinction 
being made between Target credits for transfers abroad and normal credits for the domestic 
provision of money. It can be seen that the GIPS lending is wedged in-between the credits. 
The crowding out took place primarily at the expense of Germany, as was to be expected, 
since the central bank money created in the GIPS countries flowed primarily here.
24  The 
German share of credit declined from 55% at the start of 2007 to just 14% in March 2011. 
The total for the other euro countries outside Germany and the GIPS also declined (against the 
trend), but the decline was clearly less pronounced, at 13 percentage points, than in Germany.  
 
   
                                                   
24 On average for the years considered in the chart, Germany accounted for about 29% of the euro-zone’s GDP. 
Thus, the credit share of Germany before the outbreak of the financial crisis was way above its economic weight. 
Because of the great proliferation of Pfandbriefe in Germany, which is a triply-secured kind of mortgage-backed 
instrument, the cost of procuring liquidity at the central bank was lower in Germany than in many other countries 
of the euro zone  (see  A. Chailloux, S. Gray  and R. McCaughrin, “Central Bank Collateral Frameworks: 
Principles and Policies”, IMF Working Paper No. 222, 2008). German commercial banks therefore provided 
other commercial banks within the euro area with central bank money in considerable amounts (see German 
Bundesbank, “The dynamics of the Bundesbank’s TARGET2 balance”, op. cit.). As this concerned private 
capital exports, which corresponded to a current account surplus or other capital imports, there was no noticeable 
build-up of Target balances before the onset of the financial crisis. Other reasons could have been that 
Germany’s payment transactions are very cash-intensive compared to other countries like France, that Germany 
has many foreign workers who make remittances in euros, and also that the Bundesbank has rather small stocks 
of gold and foreign exchange relative to the size of its monetary base, so that a larger part of the monetary base 
was created via lending. 23 
 
Figure 10: Shares of the euro countries in the Eurosystem’s total central bank credit  
 
Note: The central bank credits include the refinancing operations (main refinancing operations, longer-term 
refinancing operations, the marginal lending facility and other liquidity-providing operations) of the NCBs and 
the ELA loans of the Central Bank of Ireland.  
Sources: See Fig. 5; calculations by the authors. 
The shift in money-creation credit to the GIPS most likely led to a clear degradation of 
the quality of the collateral offered. The troubled commercial banks of the GIPS countries 
found it increasingly  difficult  to  provide securities bearing  small  risks of default. The 
dramatic situation of some banks in Ireland even made it impossible for them to participate in 
normal open-market operations due to a lack of suitable collateral. For this reason, the Central 
Bank of Ireland (CBI) provided short-term  emergency  loans  to  these banks (Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance, or ELA) that recent estimates put at 54 billion euros. Since their interest 
rate lies 2% to 3% above the current interest rate of the marginal lending facility,
25 the taking 
on of these loans can only be explained with a clear lowering of the collateral requirements on 
the part of the CBI ELA loans  are largely outside the control of the otherwise powerful 
Central Bank Council of the Eurosystem, but the liability for these loans rests firstly only with 
the NCBs and their sovereign.
26 The other NCBs in the Eurosystem are only liable for ELA 
loans in case of sovereign default. The ELA loans as a whole, however, do not amount to 
even one-fifth of the Target credits given to the GIPS countries. The lion’s share of the Target 
credits was issued via normal refinancing operations and represents a direct default risk for 
the other euro countries if the safety-margin deductions that the ECB required of its NCBs 
proved insufficient, which is generally presumed to be the case for the GIPS countries.
27 
                                                   
25 As the Irish Independent has written: “the interest rate paid by Irish banks on ELA is in the ‘ball park’ of 2pc-
3pc, informed sources said. The rate is based on the ECB’s marginal lending facility of 1.75pc, plus a ‘penalty’ 
reflecting the emergency nature of the aid.” See http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/banks-pay-less-than-
3pc-interest-on-euro51bn-of-emergency-funding-2529378.html. 
26 W. Buiter, J. Michels, and E. Rahbari, “ELA: At Emperor without Clothes?”, Citi Global Economics View, 21 
January 2011. 
27 See in particular M Brendel and C. Pauly, “Auf schmalem Grat”, Der Spiegel, 23 May 2011, pp. 60ff. See also 
C. Fuest, “Die EZB ist zu weit gegangen”, Handelsblatt, 15 June 2011, p. 56; P. Krugman, “The Euro Living 
Dangerously”,  NY Times Blog, 1 June 2011, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/the-euro-living-
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Economic Interpretation of the Credit Shift  
 
As explained above, the Target balances in the balance sheets of the NCBs appear as claims 
and liabilities, and in the balance of payments statistics as international capital transactions. 
These  entries do not suggest something that is  economically  non-existent, as some 
commentators  of  the  Target problem would recently have us believe (even those  in high 
offices).  They are also  no  irrelevant  clearing  balances.  Instead,  they measure the  capital 
exports flowing through the ECB system from the  core  countries of the euro zone to the 
countries on the periphery, which during the financial crisis took the place of the vanishing 
private capital flows. These capital exports through the central bank system were coerced to 
the extent that they came about as a result of political decisions of the NCBs of the GIPS and 
they were tolerated by the ECB, while the core countries’ NCBs were unable to independently 
influence their amount. They had to create the money in the course of international payments, 
and this money creation crowded out  the lending to the private banking system, because its 
demand for central bank money was limited (Fig. 7). The core countries’ NCBs could not 
have countered this even if they had wanted to. 
  Ultimately, the core countries’ NCBs shifted the stock of credit, which they usually 
gave to their domestic commercial banks by providing the domestic monetary base, to the 
peripheral countries so that the economies of these countries were able to buy goods and 
assets from the core countries. 
  A loan shifts the right of disposition over real economic resources from the lender to 
the borrower up to the time that the loan matures, when the disposition right over these 
resources is returned with interest. With a loan, things can be purchased that otherwise 
couldn’t have been, and the lender foregoes for a time the purchase of things of the same 
value.  
  In the case of a central bank loan, we could ask what the central banks of the core 
countries,  in  particular the Bundesbank, could have bought that they now cannot, because 
they have given a loan to other NCBs. The answer is: titles to claims on the commercial banks 
as they arise within the framework of the refinancing operations, and hence indirectly those 
titles  to  claims that the commercial banks must deposit as collateral for their refinancing 
activities. Whether a central bank grants a loan to a commercial bank that is now in a position 
to give a loan to a private customer in exchange for a debenture, or whether the central bank 
buys the debenture from the banks directly, does not make much difference. The liability is of 
course different, but the credit flow is the same. As Martin Wolf said in his FT column, “Let 
us call a spade a spade”.
28 
  He was referring of course to the many government bonds that the commercial banks 
from countries such as Greece or Portugal submitted to their central banks, and which at least 
in the case of Greece are no longer sufficient collateral because of the looming sovereign 
default. 
  The central bank credit that is no longer issued in Germany but in Greece serves in 
reality to finance the Greek state to a great extent. According to an estimate by J.P. Morgan, 
the share of government bonds in the collateral that the Greek commercial banks submitted to 
their central bank amounted to precisely one-third, and an additional 38% were government-
                                                   
28 M. Wolf, “Intolerable Choices for the Eurozone”, op. cit. 25 
 
backed bank bonds.
29 In reality, the European Central Bank thus allowed the Greek state to 
run its gigantic budget deficit, which in recent years amounted to about ten percent of GDP 
and more, by resorting to the European money-printing press. According to Article 123 of the 
consolidated EU  Treaty,  only  the  direct  granting  of  a central bank  loan to a state is 
prohibited.
30  Indirect  financing, however, is not ruled out by the Treaty formulation.  The 
Target credits to Greece are examples of such an indirect financing. As Figure 1 shows, by the 
end of 2010 as much as 87 billion euros in Target credits had been issued, i.e. loans that went 
beyond Greece’s internal stock of money balances and that were used to buy goods and assets 
abroad.  
  These loans were  withdrawn  from  those economic  subjects whose securities  the 
Bundesbank would otherwise have been able to accept as collateral for credits in the banking 
system. In Germany this could have been the state, but because of the much smaller German 
budget deficit it was more likely to have been firms in the private sector that normally obtain 
loans from the banks against bonds and other assets. 
  To use again the simple example from above, the investor from whom the credit was 
withdrawn could also have been a German transport contractor.
31 Since the Bundesbank did 
not issue the credit to a German transportation company via a German commercial bank but 
via  the European central banking  system and a Greek commercial  bank to a Greek 
transportation company, the truck is delivered to a Greek instead of a German transportation 
company. For jobs at the German truck manufacturer both amount to the same thing, and also 
the amount of money that circulates in Germany after the transaction is the same. The only 
difference is that the truck now operates in Greece instead of Germany. 
  Of course it doesn’t have to be a loan to a truck buyer in Germany that is withdrawn. It 
could be that loans to other investments in Germany are crowded out; it could also be that 
German capital exports to other countries are reduced, so that investment in those places is 
affected. Or it could be that in the end, the public capital flowing through the Eurosystem to 
Greece just turns around and flows back as capital flight, since the Greek NCB loans make it 
possible for wealthy Greeks to sell their government bonds to the banks and take their wealth 
out of the country, an issue that we will discuss below. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact 
location and type of the countertrade, which is in any case difficult to observe and track, since 
capital market countertrades are usually spread around numerous companies and countries. 
The fact is, in any case, that when a net capital flow to Greece occurs because the credit from 
the ECB does not finance solely capital flight from Greece, somewhere else another use of the 
credit must be crowded out when additional credit is given via the central bank system to the 
GIPS countries, because with the given stock of money and given savings, a loan for one use 
can only be provided at the expense of another use. 
  This is not meant to say that someone is credit-constrained, as some commentators 
have surmised; in other  words, that someone cannot receive a loan that he wants at the given 
interest rate. Even in an ideal market, in which everyone can borrow as much as he or she 
wishes,  a  strict aggregate budget constraint applies  in the sense that the  sum of the 
investments that can be financed on credit (or other forms of capital, especially equity capital) 
is limited by the sum of savings. The existence and compliance with aggregated budget 
                                                   
29  N.  Panigirtzoglou, G. Koo, S. MacGorain and M. Lehmann, “Who are the Losers from a Greek Debt 
Restructuring?”, Flows and Liquidity, J.P. Morgan, Global Asset Allocation, 6 May 2011. 
30 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 123, Section 1. 
31 A similar example of a tractor in H.-W. Sinn’s FAZ article (“Die riskante Kreditersatzpolitik der EZB”, op. 
cit.) irritated some bloggers.  26 
 
constraints is a key requirement for the functioning of a market economy that has nothing to 
do with rationing in the narrower sense. The aggregate budget constraint lead to a crowding 
out of one credit by another. This is basically the main law of capitalism. Since we don’t live 
in paradise, we normally cannot obtain credit out of nothing. There is resource rivalry. 
  This assertion must be qualified for the case of Keynesian underemployment. If the 
crisis of the GIPS was induced by a collapse in demand, the rivalry of different uses of credit 
may not prevail. In Keynesian unemployment, an additional credit shifted from one country to 
another can trigger an investment boom in the recipient country with multiplier effects on 
GDP which, in line with the Keynesian proposition that “investment creates its own savings”, 
creates exactly as much credit as the investment needs. In this case, there would be no 
resource rivalry. We do not want to rule out that this was temporarily so. This is one of the 
reasons why we considered the ECB policy correct during the acute phase of the crisis. 
  This phase is, however, already over, and it is now evident that the main problem in 
the GIPS resides in the fact that the overheating of their economies during the years before the 
financial crisis made them much too expensive, so that they are now in classical instead of  
Keynesian unemployment. Germany, in contrast, went into a boom after the financial crisis 
and already in 2010 was complaining of a skilled-labour shortage. In such a situation, there is 
undoubtedly a rivalry of  resources in the goods and factor markets, so that the crowding out 
of credit, which as we showed is a fact at the central bank refinancing credit level, must also 
occur in the rest of the economy.  
  Even in this situation it is possible that instead of domestic investment capital export 
into another country is crowded out if the Target credits flow to the GIPS. However, this does 
not alter in any way the resource rivalry nor the fact that the Target credits, in the proportion 
that they did not just serve to finance the capital flight of asset owners, were prevented from 
serving other uses. And it is also not true that the financing burden disappears because it is 
distributed throughout the huge pool of global capital. This would only be the case if all 
capital investments were perfect substitutes, for example if there were no investment risks. 
  The world is indeed far removed from this, as the tremendous interest-rate spreads for 
the European countries now show, and which are illustrated in Figure 11. Because of the 
exchange rate risks, interest rates were widely spread before the irrevocable establishment of 
exchange rates (1998) in the euro zone, and they have spread again since the beginning of the 
crisis because investors reckon with different default probabilities among the euro countries. 
Exorbitantly high interest rates must now be paid by some GIPS countries. 
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Figure 11: Net yields of 10-year government bonds 
 
 
Source: Reuters EcoWin, Government Benchmarks, Bid, 10 year, yield, close; Eurostat. 
 
  The interest-rate spreads show that the national capital markets, even in the euro area, 
are not as closely woven as the idea of a perfect global capital market would suggest. For this 
reason we can assume that it is not irrelevant from which country central bank credits are 
diverted and to which countries they flow. The more capital  flows via public channels from 
the European core countries to the countries on the periphery, the smaller the interest spreads 
will be, which will mean higher rates for the former and lower rates for the latter than would 
be the case without such public channels. Higher rates for Germany, for example, are to be 
expected if public lending to other euro countries expands even further, because Germany’s 
creditworthiness  will suffer due to  the risks associated with the granting of loans to the 
peripheral states. The more instruments of joint liability are introduced in Europe, the fewer 
the differences in the creditworthiness of the European countries as assessed by investors and 
their rating-agencies and the more the interest rates will be compressed to a uniform, average 
level. Moreover, the comparative lowering of interest rates that is linked to the granting of 
loans to the peripheral countries would induce the ECB in the medium term to raise its main 
refinancing rate  because  then fewer braking  effects are to be feared in the peripheral 
countries. 
  In  this respect it can also be assumed that the gigantic flow of Target credits has 
delayed the increase of the interest spreads. That in spite of this the large interest rate spreads 
were not kept at bay is presumably due to the Target credits being ultimately only available to 
a limited extent, as we will show in the next section. The fundamental imbalances in the euro 
zone are much too great for the ECB to offset with its own means. 
  It is true that Germany is currently benefiting from the interest spreads, but this is only 
a relative benefit. During the first stage of the euro, from the time it was announced in the 
1990s,  Germany’s economy stagnated. There was mass unemployment, capital left the 28 
 
country, Germany had the lowest investment share of all OECD countries, the second-lowest 
growth rate in Europe, falling real-estate prices, the lowest wage increases in the euro zone 
and a 20% real depreciation vis-à-vis its trading partners in the euro zone. Germany exported 
two-thirds of its savings abroad in recent years. After China, Germany was the world’s largest 
capital exporter. German savings flowed to America,  to Eastern Europe and to the countries 
on the European periphery. The balance-sheets of German banks and insurance companies, 
though not to the extent of those of their French counterparts, filled up with the government 
bonds of these countries because, according to the Basel regulations in force at the time, this 
did not have to be backed up with capital reserves. Then the financial crisis hit, and capital 
was reluctant to  leave the country. This completely changed the basic situation in the capital 
markets. The growing supply of credit triggered an investment boom in Germany, leading in 
the short term to a strong upswing in economic activity and giving the country a favourable 
growth outlook for the coming decade. This forecast and interpretation of the events was first 
put forward by H.-W. Sinn in June 2010 and has now become widely accepted.
32 In this 
respect, Germany’s present economic situation is certainly able to cope with the continuation 
of the public credit flow from the Bundesbank to the European periphery. This cannot  be 
denied. 
  However, the credit flow  through the ECB system undermines the necessary 
correction of the misguided developments in the years before the crisis. The decision of the 
markets not to send capital to the periphery in exorbitant amounts as  was the case in the 
exuberant, carefree phase of the capital markets up to 2008, is being partly offset by the credit 
policy of the ECB. However one assesses this development, it is a fact. It will not put an end 
to the German boom. But it is clear that a strengthening of the rescue systems, be it via the 
ECB or  the Luxembourg funds,  will reduce the interest-rate  spreads. This will at least 
partially revitalize the capital flows  out of Germany, which had accorded Germany an 
extremely difficult decade  before  the  crisis, and it will perpetuate the current account 
imbalances. As long as the overhang of imports over exports is financed, the imbalance will 
persist; it will disappear only when it can no longer be financed. 
We want to emphasise it once again: the ECB was right in providing help during the 
acute phase of the crisis, easing the situation in the capital markets, which, seized by panic, 
stepped on the brakes too quickly. Thus we do not support the view that the ECB should 
never have permitted the Target credits  to be granted. When the crisis erupted, it was 
necessary to act quickly – faster than the European parliaments could have responded. In light 
of this situation, the action taken by the ECB was justifiable and appropriate. 
However, this policy has been in place for four years now and is in the process of 
becoming a permanent fixture. This is wrong and dangerous. In the meantime the European 
parliaments had numerous opportunities to consider the lending policy and the necessary 
relief measures. 
Our view is that the parliaments could have been involved earlier because the Target 
credits were not of a monetary policy nature. The policy neither changed the entire monetary 
base of the euro zone, nor did it  result in a different distribution amongst the individual 
                                                   
32 See H.-W. Sinn, “Nachweisbare Wirkung”, Wirtschaftswoche, 7 June 2010, No. 23, p. 39 (also published as 
“Reallocation of Savings in Europe”, Ifo Viewpoint No. 115, 22 June 2010); H.-W. Sinn, “Rescuing Europe”, 
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countries. It was a purely fiscal measure which could have involved the parliaments in the 
process and been financed by the budgets of the euro countries. 
In the Central Bank Council every country, whether large or small, has one vote and 
the majority rules. Malta has, in formal terms, the same voting rights as France. That is not a 
problem as long as the central bank restricts its activities to monetary policy. The Central 
Bank Council has not done this, however. It has instead used its power to provide excessive 
credit to the central banks of peripheral countries by repeatedly accepting yet another decline 
in the collateral standards for the refinancing operations. As a result, the provision of money 
in the peripheral countries far exceeded their own transaction needs, which led to the huge 
Target balances. 
Whichever way the further economic effects of the credit shift through the Eurosystem 
are judged, whether one believes in the Keynesian miracle of credit creation out of nothing or 
rather a world with competition for resources: The Target credits that the central banks of the 
European core countries – first and foremost the Bundesbank – gave to the periphery are, in 
terms of the right of disposition over economic resources, payment flows, international 
distribution of central bank money, and the liability involved, essentially identical to jointly 
and proportionately guaranteed short-term Eurobonds that must be bought by the core euro 
countries, with the resulting revenue being lent to the peripheral countries that are unable to 
obtain the finance they need on the market or only at unfavourable terms. Eurobonds such as 
these shift the disposition of economic resources from the core countries to the periphery in 
the same way that the Target credits do. Credit and money flow from the core countries to the 
periphery, and money comes back to buy goods or assets. Such bonds would also not change 
the distribution of the monetary base in Europe, and they would also allocate credit and thus 
the disposition of economic resources to the recipient countries at the expense of the creditor 
countries. Even the liability would be identical. If the credit-receiving country went bankrupt, 
all euro countries would be liable in proportion to their capital shares in the ECB, which for 
each country is the average of the population size and share of GDP. Everything is the same 
as with Target credits.  
That is probably why several European governments supported the introduction of 
Eurobonds in 2010 so vigorously. They were afraid of what would happen when the Target 
policy ended and logically wanted to continue – by way of a joint institution in Luxembourg 
and the issuance of Eurobonds – what the European Central Bank had been practicing for 
years. 
  However the policy of the ECB is evaluated in the end, it is clear that all of its 
economic effects –  whether strong or weak, whether beneficial or dangerous –  basically 
correspond to the effects of short-term Eurobonds. Europe needs to discuss this issue openly.  
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Target Credit, Current Account Imbalances and Capital Movements 
 
In order to capture the importance of the credit transfer to the GIPS by the ECB, it is useful to 
look again at the third definition of Target balances  in the second section of this paper. 
According to it, a country’s Target debt measures the accumulated balance of payment deficit 
with other euro countries, i.e., the accumulated  net outflow of euro central bank money for 
the purchase of goods and assets from other euro countries (plus interest). Translated into the 
language of the foreign trade statistics, this means that the increase of a country’s Target 
liability  over  one year equals the sum of (private and public) net capital exports and the 
current account deficit vis-à-vis other euro countries, as this is the size of the net outflow of 
euro central bank money to the other euro countries. A net capital export equals  the net 
accrual of assets in other countries, and a current account deficit is basically defined as that 
part of the excess of imports of goods and services over exports that is not financed with 
transfers (gifts) from other countries. As explained earlier, in the foreign trade statistics the 
net outflow of central bank money, i.e. the increase in the national Target debt, is shown quite 
correctly as capital imports of the country via the central bank system. In the following, 
however, the terms “capital imports“ or “capital exports” always correspond to the private and 
public  sectors  outside the central bank, unless otherwise noted. Analogously, we do not 
include changes in the stocks of foreign currency in our definition of capital flows.   
  Let’s call the increase of a euro country’s Target debt ∆T, its current account deficit 
vis-à-vis all foreign countries L, its current account deficit vis-à-vis other non-euro countries 
n L , its net capital exports to all foreign countries K  and its net capital exports to non-euro 
countries  n K . Then the increase of the country’s Target debt is  
                                                    nn T LL KK ∆=− +−  
  () nn LK L K =+− + . 
  Here the term in parentheses in the second line of the equation measures the net 
acquisition of goods and assets  from outside the euro zone, which is a net outflow of foreign 
exchange.  In a system of fixed exchange rates, this term could have a considerable size, 
because the euro central banks would intervene in order to stabilise the exchange rates. For 
example, they could sell dollars for euros in order to permit euro citizens to acquire  such 
goods and assets in net terms. But the European national central banks don’t do this, or if they 
do, they do so in only a minute volume. It was and is the declared policy of the ECB to let 
exchange rates float freely. Private changes in foreign cash holdings were probably equally 
negligible. Thus, a euro country’s  current account balances vis-à-vis non-euro countries can 
be assumed to be offset by identical balances in the capital accounts vis-à-vis such  countries, 
and the term in parentheses approximates zero. Thus the above equation simplifies to    
  T LK LZ ∆≈+ =−, 
where Z is the euro country’s net capital imports from all foreign countries. The first term on 
the right-hand side says that an increase of the Target debt of a euro country, in the case of 
lacking foreign exchange operations, equals the sum of the current account deficit vis-à-vis all 
foreign countries inside and outside  the euro zone and  the net capital exports to them. 
Equivalently, the second term says that the increase of the Target debt equals that part of a 31 
 
euro country’s current account deficit vis-à-vis all other countries that is not financed by 
(private and public) capital imports from the rest of the world. This is the definition that had 
already been supplied by H.-W. Sinn in his FAZ article, only here we distinguished explicitly 
between the euro area and the other countries.
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  Figure 2 already showed that the Target balances of the GIPS countries were close to 
zero until 2007 inclusively, that is shortly before the outbreak of the financial crisis, and only 
surged thereafter. Until 2007 the GIPS capital imports must therefore have been as large as 
their current account deficits.  All net purchases abroad were financed by a net inflow of 
capital. As public capital flows were minimal until then, the current account deficit was in fact 
financed with inflows of private capital. That is the normal case that is always expected when 
a country has a current account deficit. 
  As Figure 2 showed, the GIPS Target liabilities then rose dramatically to 340 billion 
euros to December 2010, while at the same time Germany accumulated Target claims worth 
326 billion euros. The increase in the Target liability of the GIPS countries in these three 
years, from December 2007 to December 2010, amounted to 321 billion euros, while the 
increase in the Target claims of the Bundesbank amounted to 255 billion euros. The German 
Target claims had already risen markedly by the middle of 2007. The question now concerns 
the relationship of these figures with the current account balances over these three years.  A 
look at Figure 12 may be useful for this purpose, as it shows the evolution of these balances.  
 
Figure 12: Current account balances  
 
Source: Eurostat, Wirtschaft und Finanzen,  Zahlungsbilanz, Zahlungsbilanzstatistiken nach Land; Ifo Institute 
calculations. 
  Figure 12 shows that the current account deficit of the GIPS evolved almost like the 
mirror-image of the German current account surplus. While the German surplus reached a 
maximum of 181 billion euros in 2007, the deficit of the GIPS countries rose to 171 billion 
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euros a year later. The curves are so similar that they almost mirror each other. Christine 
Lagarde, the French Finance Minister, commented accurately:  “It takes two to tango.”  
  The current account deficits of the GIPS were  considerable,  exceeding  100 billion 
euros per year during and after the crisis. Together, they amounted to 365 billion euros for the 
three years from 2008 to 2010. That is higher by 44 billion euros than the 321-billion-euro 
increase in the Target liabilities of these countries over the same period. The conclusion is 
that the GIPS as a total still received 44 billion euros in capital imports, whereas the 
remainder of the foreign trade bill, i.e. 321 billion euros, was  financed by Target credits, 
hence, ultimately, by the money-printing press. 
  Figure 13 clarifies this fact by comparing the curve of the accumulated current account 
deficits of the GIPS countries with the time series of their Target liabilities, familiar from 
Figure 2. The red curve shows the Target debt of the GIPS countries and the blue curve shows 
the current account deficits accumulated by these countries since the end of 2007. The starting 
point of the blue curve has been shifted to the value of the Target debt by the end of 2007, to 
be able to compare the accumulated sum of current account deficits with the increase in the 
Target debt since this point in time as, according to the above equations, the difference 
between these quantities is the sum of the capital imports of the GIPS countries accumulated 
since the end of 2007. We remind the reader of our definitions, according to which, unless 
otherwise stated, the capital imports meant here are only the private and public capital imports 
and not the capital import obtained via the central bank system as measured by the Target 
debt itself. The vertical distance  between these two curves equals the accumulated capital 
imports.  
  To facilitate the interpretation of the curves we may perhaps formulate it as follows: If 
the blue curve of the current account deficits without the Target credits had developed the 
way it did (which surely would not have been the case), then the distance from the small 
horizontal auxiliary line to this curve would measure the accumulated capital imports since 
the end of 2007. With the Target debt that was built up, these capital imports were however 
diminished to the extent that Target debt became available. In other words, private capital 
imports were  replaced  by  the forced capital imports  through the ECB system, always 
assuming (falsely) that the current account deficits did not react to the ECB policies. 
  Although there was no statistical correlation between the movements of the two curves 
quarter on quarter, the  figures were comparable. The curve of the accumulated current 
account deficits lies a bit above the curve of the Target debt. This shows that the accumulated 
capital imports were always positive. Toward the end of 2010 these accumulated capital 
imports amounted to the already mentioned 44 billion euros. This was 12% of the entire 
capital requirements created by the current account deficit. Fully 88% was evidently financed 
by the Target balances, i.e. by the money-printing press. 
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Figure 13: Financing the GIPS current account deficits via the Target system  
 
 
Note: The Target liability level can be read directly from the left axis. In order to show which proportion of the 
current account deficits of the GIPS was financed through their Target liabilities, the current account deficits 
must be accumulated over time. This figure makes it possible to approximate the evolution of the GIPS liabilities 
to the rest of the world. While no conclusion can be derived from this regarding the absolute level of 
indebtedness, since it changes with the selection of the starting point and thus the number of years accumulated, 
it does make it possible to say something about the change in indebtedness between two points in time. For the 
accumulated current account deficit the starting point chosen was the end of 2007, since the systematic Target 
liabilities arose after that.  Given that data on the current account balances of the GIPS are available only until 
the fourth quarter of 2010, the depiction of their Target liabilities also ends in December 2010. The difference 
between the current account deficits accumulated by the GIPS over the years from 2008 to 2010 (365 billion 
euros) and the change in their Target liabilities over the period December 2007-December 2010 (321 billion 
euros) measures ultimately the size of the accumulated private and public capital imports of the GIPS (excepting 
the capital imports through the central bank system) over the years from 2008 to 2010. It amounted to 44 billion 
euros. 
 Sources: International Monetary Fund (see Figure 5) and Eurostat, Data set, Wirtschaft und Finanzen, 
Leistungsbilanz nach Ländern; Ifo Institute calculations.   
 
  Interesting is also the comparison with Germany. On the one hand, Figures 1 and 2 
had already shown that the counterpart of  the build-up of the Target debt of the GIPS 
countries was almost exclusively the Target claims of the Bundesbank. The rest of the euro 
countries contributed but little to the events. On the other hand, the Lagardian Tango diagram 
(Figure 12) shows that the German current account surpluses were the counterpart of the 
deficits of the GIPS countries. Total German current account surpluses during the past three 
years amounted to 430 billion euros, and the increase in Target claims during this time 
amounted, as mentioned, to 255 billion euros. This implies that in the period from 2008 to 
2010 the Target credits granted by the Bundesbank to the GIPS via the ECB system amounted 
to 60% of the German current account surplus and nearly 70% of the current account deficits 
of the GIPS.  In view of these figures, the impression that the Bundesbank has become a 
gigantic foreign trade bank  that  financed German exports to the European periphery is 
undeniable. In the final analysis a considerable share of the entire export surplus of the past 34 
 
three years was paid for by newly printed money, for which the countries of the periphery at 
the expense of the Bundesbank – but also with its endorsement - got the printing permission 
from the ECB. The interest rate for the credit that the GIPS countries received was only 1%. 
Since it was below the market interest rate and below the inflation rate, this credit may also be 
considered an implicit export subsidy.   
  But let us return to the relationship between the current account balances and capital 
flows of the GIPS. Figure 13 only shows this relationship in the aggregate, i.e. for the total of 
the GIPS. It does not yet follow from this relationship, and that must be emphasised, that the 
balance looked similar for each individual country. This is shown in Figure 14, where the 
comparison between the Target debt and the accumulated current account deficits is broken 
down for the countries. The charts are basically drawn in the same way as Figure 13, only that 
the auxiliary coordinates are not depicted. The horizontal distance between the curves shows 
the net capital imports accumulated since the end of 2007 when the blue curve lies above the 
red one, or the net capital exports accumulated when the red curve lies above the blue one.  
 
Figure 14: Current account and Target balances in detail 
 
Sources: See Figure 13   
  It is easily noticeable that an approximate equality between the accumulated current 
account deficit and the Target debt only exists for Greece and Portugal. In these countries, the 
sum of the private and public capital flows during the past three years was virtually zero. The 
local NCB financed the current account deficit in its entirety. This does not mean, of course, 
that there is a correlation of the values in a statistical sense.
34 When the deficits had to be 
financed, private credit was available temporarily just to dry out again later on, and the central 
                                                   
34 On this, see point 1 in the Response to the critics section.  35 
 
banks had to help out. Later there were loans from the community of countries. There was a 
permanent to and fro, an interplay between the bull-headed capital markets and the NBCs that 
helped out whenever the capital flows were insufficient. Only in the sum of the three years 
can it be said that the increase in Target liabilities created by the additional creation of money 
in these countries was of a magnitude that financed the current account deficits. 
  For Ireland and Spain things were quite different, and in both directions. Spain 
evidently had still been able to attract private capital inflows to finance its current account 
deficit, so that the Spanish NCB only had to help out sporadically to pay for the excess 
imports. Total Target liabilities during the three years only increased by 46 billion euros, 
while the accumulated current account deficit came to 207 billion euros.   
  The opposite occurred in Ireland. Ireland was affected by a massive capital flight, 
reflected in the fact that its cumulative current account deficit over the three years was only 
16 billion euros, while its Target liabilities over the same period rose by 145 billion euros (to 
142 billion euros).  That was almost as much as  Ireland’s  annual  GDP, which recently 
amounted to 160 billion euros. In proportion to its size, the country has a gigantic banking 
system. For this reason, after the Lehman collapse in 2008 the government provided 
guarantees to the country’s banks amounting to two-and-a-half times  the nation’s GDP.
35 
These guarantees, however, evidently did not restore confidence. The banks and the other 
capital market operators that had congregated in Ireland decided to withdraw their capital 
from the country; they did this by selling their assets to the Central Bank of Ireland and 
seeking a safe haven for their cash elsewhere. At the same time, the commercial banks in 
other European countries either refused to provide further credit to the Irish banks or only at 
extremely high interest. The Central Bank of Ireland acted, in this case, as a rescuer in a life-
and-death situation, stepping into the breach and cranking up its money-printing machine. 
  In a smaller measure, capital flight also occurred in Greece. Since the increase in 
Greece’s Target liabilities was as large as its accumulated current account deficit despite the 
public rescue programmes agreed in 2010, the net capital flight must have been about as large 
as these rescue programmes were. 
  All in all, the accumulation of Target liabilities was enormous, with 46 billion for 
Spain, 54 billion for Portugal, 76 billion for Greece and 145 billion for Ireland in only three 
years, altogether 321 billion more than at the end of 2007. 
  The question arises as to  what would have happened if the central banks of these 
countries had been unable to issue more money than the respective economies required for 
domestic circulation. Without a doubt, considerable defaults would have taken place and 
many banks would have collapsed, because the commercial banking systems would not have 
been able to refinance themselves. This is the reason why the ECB’s bailout policy in the 
initial stage of the crisis was right, when a timely crafting of rescue packages by the 
parliaments was simply not feasible. We want to emphasise this position once again.  
  Further dramatic consequences could also be expected for the capital flows and the 
current account balances, since the dearth of credit would have pushed the interest rates even 
                                                   
35 See Casino Capitalism. How the Financial Crisis Came about and What Needs to Be Done Now, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2010, p. 193.  
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higher than they already were, and the market would have forced the current account deficits 
to equal the capital imports. The current account deficits would perforce have diminished, 
because investors, faced with such high interest premiums, would have taken on far fewer 
loans. Both the demand and the supply sides would have worked to contract the economy: 
imports would have decreased, and the falling wages and prices would have stimulated 
exports. 
  But that would not have been all. The rising interest rates would have dampened down 
capital flight or would even have induced a capital import. That would have been positive for 
the afflicted countries. If no accessible credit is available domestically, real estate cannot be 
sold, and the banks would leave in the lurch investors in government bonds, which in fact 
they acquired in massive amounts thanks to the Target loans. The capital is practically 
confined to the country in which it finds itself. With higher interest rates, the price of assets 
would have plunged, effective yields would have increased, and at some point the prices 
would have been so low that capital gains could once again be expected. The capital would 
have stayed in the country, and even fresh capital would have started flowing in from abroad 
again. The capital market, in such a scenario, would have probably stabilised quite quickly.  
  To be sure, there would have been many bankruptcies, but a bankruptcy does not mean 
that the assets disappear, only that they change hands. A bit more courage to let the market 
processes run their course would have saved the ECB the huge problems posed by the stock 
of dubious collateral it now has to live with. 
  The cheap loans given by the NCBs made it possible for the much-derided capital 
flight to attain the volumes observed. When this aspect is taken into consideration, the largest 
beneficiaries of the ECB policy were most of all wealthy individuals in the GIPS who 
managed to shift their capital abroad to safety. But of course the beneficiaries also included 
the owners of the banks and insurance companies in the heart of Europe, in particular those in 
France but also in Germany. In the first quarter of 2010 French banks had invested twice as 
much, relative to the size of their country’s economy, in government bonds as German banks, 
and they had invested mostly in the southern European countries. German banks had invested 
heavily in Ireland. They all managed to avoid, in the nick of time, massive write-off losses by 
selling their holdings to the local commercial banks, which then took refinancing loans from 
their NCBs. The bailout carried out by the ECB provided, as we now know, only temporary 
relief, since the interest premiums are now higher than ever before (see Figure 11). But for 
many real estate owners and government bond holders this policy meant salvation.  
  The ECB could have decided differently. Once the acute phase of the crisis was over, 
it could have handed the rescue function over to the parliaments and the markets, since, as 
explained above, it operated a bailout and thus adopted purely fiscal measures that bear little 
resemblance to monetary policy, in a strict sense of  the word. That would have probably also 
been better for European economic development. It is not possible to intervene against market 
processes in an open-ended fashion; such interventions must run their course and then, when 
the direst immediate threats have been overcome, be wrapped up. The experience of many 
years of futile attempts by central banks to manipulate exchange rates should be more than 
sufficient proof of that. Instead of sinking immeasurable resources into interventions aimed at 
enforcing exchange rates way out of equilibrium, today’s central banks have become tolerant 
and, with the exception of China and a couple of other countries, refrain from applying such 
policies. They have learned that fighting the markets does not get them very far, and that it is 
sometimes cheaper and more promising to let one side of Wall Street fight it out with the 
other side, instead of themselves stepping into the fray to try to impose market prices that they 
consider right.  37 
 
Five minutes to midnight 
 
The many inconclusive attempts to use central bank interventions to keep exchange rates from 
their equilibrium values have shown that gigantic volumes of capital are necessary and that 
the central banks may still be losers in the end. One of the most impressive lessons was the 
fight of the Bank of England against George Soros’s short-selling in 1992. At the time, the 
Bank of England had tried to support the pound sterling by selling dollars, deutschmarks and 
francs out of its stocks. It lost the battle, because George Soros had calculated the size of the 
foreign currency reserves of the bank and knew how many pounds sterling he had to sell short 
in order to win over the Bank of England. He won, the pound sterling had to be devalued, and 
Great Britain failed to meet the entrance conditions for the European Monetary Union. 
   The situation of the ECB reminds of such futile attempts, as its stock of munitions is 
also limited. By relocating money creation to the GIPS it has defied the financial markets for 
three or four years. It offset Ireland’s capital flight and  financed the Irish current account 
deficit. In Spain it financed the portion of the current account deficit that the capital markets 
refused to finance. And for Greece and Portugal, where private capital funding has dried up, it 
almost fully financed current account deficits of 10% of GDP and more. In the aggregate of 
all the GIPS, it financed 88% of the current account deficits of the past three years.  
  All of this has caused the portion of the monetary base originating in these countries 
that does not circulate there to surge from just 4 billion euros at the start of 2007 to 340 billion 
at the end of 2010. 
  As shown in the third section of this paper, the monetary base created by credit in 
these countries accounted for 66% of the Eurosystem’s total credit by March 2011, although 
the GDP share of these countries amounts to only 18%. The additional money that the GIPS 
NCBs have lent to their businesses during the past three years in order to permit local firms, 
banks and citizens to finance net imports of goods and assets or, in other words, to live 
beyond their means and to move their assets to safe havens abroad, had already absorbed 59% 
of the total stock of central bank credit of the Eurosystem. At the same time, the central bank 
credit issued by the other countries declined from 87% of total central bank credit, or 387 
billion euros, to 34%, or 179 billion euros, by March 2011. The Bundesbank was affected 
most. Refinancing loans fell from originally 55% (early 2007) to only 14%, or in absolute 
numbers from 246 billion euros to 76 billion. As the Target credits to the GIPS rose by more 
than 100 billion euros per year during the past three years, it is foreseeable that if the policy of 
credit shifting is continued, the remaining 179 billion euros of the other euro countries or the 
remaining 78 billion euros of the Bundesbank will be used up soon. The end of this policy is 
unavoidable. It may last for another two years, but then it will end. 
  Figure 15 illustrates the problem. It essentially combines Figures 9 and 10, which were 
explained in detail above. The upper chart shows a hypothetical projection, extending the 
evolution of the refinancing loans to the GIPS, including the Target credits. The lower chart 
shows another projection, extending the path of German refinancing loans. Both projections 
confirm the statement that if this trend continues, crowding out will lead to the end of the 38 
 
credit replacement business of the ECB in about two years, i.e. in 2013, as there will be no 
more central bank credit in Germany or the other euro countries that could be shifted to the 
GIPS. This does not mean that the Eurosystem credit remaining at the core countries’ NCBs 
despite the credit shifts will actually disappear soon. What it means is that the ECB is under 
enormous pressure to prevent this from happening. 
   
Figure 15: End in sight 
 
Sources: See Figures 9 and 10; calculations by the authors. 
 
  If the central bank credit in the Non-GIPS countries should be completely crowded 
out, the ECB would still be able to grant new money creation credit to the GIPS, but the 
automatic sterilisation of the increase in the money supply coming from the GIPS by reducing 
the refinancing operations in the core countries would no longer be possible. 
  This means either that the ECB would have to accept entering an inflationary regime 
in which the monetary base rises in the same amount as the annual increments of the Target 
liabilities  of the GIPS, or that it  would have to  consciously adopt other sterilising policy 
measures. It could, for example, ask the national central banks to sell their gold stocks, as this 
will eliminate central bank money. In this way it could sterilise the additional money that is 
spent in the GIPS countries. But in fact this would imply financing the GIPS through the gold 
sales of the other NCBs. It is easy to imagine that the public might not like this. Or it can 39 
 
itself issue bonds and thus run up debt in the market and so mop up the excessive money. But 
this, too, would be an unusual measure with scant chances of enjoying public acceptance. The 
ECB faces a dilemma. 
  The exhaustion of the stock of refinancing credit would also undermine  the 
transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy decisions. By changing the main refinancing rate 
it typically affects interbank lending rates and by this has an influence on the commercial 
banks’ interest rates for new loans to firms and private households. As most banks of the core 
countries would abstain from participating in the ECB’s refinancing operations, given that all 
the liquidity they need arrives through the transactions of their customers, the ECB’s interest 
rate would no longer be able to directly affect the interbank lending rate in the core. The ECB 
rate would just be the rate at which the commercial banks of the GIPS countries can borrow, 
and in the rest of the Eurozone a separate, smaller short-term interest rate for interbank loans 
would develop. The main refinancing rate would just be a short-term rate for risky banks with 
dubious collateral, and apart from that there would be a well-functioning interbank market 
between safe banks with a correspondingly lower interest rate. This would be a disaster for 
the functioning of the ECB and its ability to carry out the policies to which it is legally 
obliged, in particular the ability to keep inflation under control.  
  This is probably the reason why in 2010 the ECB argued so vehemently in favour of 
the EMU member countries establishing the Luxembourg Rescue Fund EFSF  (European 
Financial Stability Facility)  and is now also voting for the ESM (European Stability 
Mechanism), intended to turn the EFSF into a permanent institution. The ESM is to help 
distressed countries by providing low-interest loans, relieving thus the ECB of this role, which 
is now in its fourth year.
36 Although the Fund may not issue Eurobonds, its activity closely 
approaches the issuing of such bonds. On the one hand it may go into debt itself and pass on 
the borrowed funds to the distressed countries. On the other hand, the euro  countries are 
jointly liable in proportion to their capital shares, as they do with Eurobonds. In its core, in 
terms of credit flows and liability, the Fund is very similar to Target credits. That Target 
credits are in fact short-term Eurobonds was already shown above. 
It is not really clear under which terms the Fund will grant its loans, whether it only 
represents the ultima ratio of assistance as is desired by Germany, or whether it will become a 
permanent institution providing its funds almost automatically up to the amount defined by 
the European Commission through its various debt limits, which would turn these limits 
politically into borrowing rights. In any case, the problem of increasing Target debt will be 
mitigated to the extent this Fund becomes active.  
  By itself, the money  flowing into the GIPS banking system via the Fund will lead 
there to a build-up of Target claims on the ECB.  In this way the Fund may slow down these 
countries’ further build-up of Target debt or even stop or reverse it. The Fund is a perfect 
substitute for the Target credits and logically follows up where the ECB let off. Not much 
time remains for the establishment of this Fund, as shown in Figure 15, since in 2013 the 
remaining NBC credit of the other euro countries will no longer suffice for sterilisation. No 
wonder then that the start of the ESM is dated for 2013, the year in which the Target policy 
arrives at its logical end. 
                                                   
36Although the interest rate on credits is to exceed the interest rate on safe bonds by 1 to 2 percentage points, 
such an interest surcharge is considerably lower than that demanded by the financial markets. In May 2011, the 
average CDS insurance for government bonds of the GIPS countries, weighted by their Target credit shares, 
amounted to about 8%. For hedging the loan loss risk of the GIPS countries, the euro community would have to 
pay an interest surcharge of 8%.  40 
 
  This shows the whole extent of the muddled situation into which Europe has got itself 
with the euro. Initially the euro, by eliminating exchange rate risks, channelled huge private 
capital flows to the GIPS, which caused overheating there and made them too expensive. 
Then the capital market stalled, and the GIPS, burdened by excessive wages and prices, were 
left with a current account deficit that could no longer be financed. The ECB helped out with 
the money-printing press, creating huge Target debts because it facilitated capital flight and 
therefore permitted a good deal of the desired stabilisation effect to evaporate. Although the 
ECB prevented a collapse of the banking system, it also relieved these countries from having 
to push through the necessary domestic adjustments. Thus, Spain, Portugal and Greece have 
yet to start the necessary real devaluation by reducing wages and prices. Only Ireland has 
managed this. Its current account has shown a slight surplus since the second half of 2010. 
  Because the ECB carried out its measures for too long and to an excessive extent, it 
brought Europe into the tricky position from which politics now hopes to extricate itself only 
by throwing more and more good money after bad. This further delays the necessary 
devaluation of the southern countries, perpetuates their current account deficits and thus leads 
to a rapid exhaustion of the available funds. It is our fear that the ESM will also reach its 
limits after a few years and that Europe will once again find itself in a nearly  hopeless 
position. Perhaps the capacity of the ESM will then be raised again. After that the Eurobonds 
will be introduced, as  a huge liability union  will have been established by then, or a 
voluminous transfer system will be created in Europe reminiscent of the intra-German transfer 
union or the Italian transfers to its Mezzogiorno. If this system is then extended to Eastern 
Europe, there will be a dozen Mezzogiorni in Europe, countries and regions that will 
permanently be on the drip of the stronger regions, become dependent on them and will never 
get back on their feet again.  
  In view of such horror visions one can only recommend European policymakers to 
introduce in time a policy of strict budget constraints. This includes the introduction of a crisis 
mechanism for the ESM that provides the available funds according to a well-defined 
procedure, but keeps them scant enough in order to force the concerned countries to make the 
necessary adjustments. The European Economic Advisory Group at CESifo has developed a 
proposal  that distinguishes among a liquidity crisis, an impending insolvency and a full 
insolvency and then, on the one hand, activates well-metered assistance programs and, on the 
other hand, proposes the  successively increasing participation of the banks and other 
investors. The proposal boils down to an insurance for investors against sovereign default, but 
that is not a full-coverage insurance: it includes a deductible that the investors themselves 
must bear. The proposal would retain the interest spreads in Europe, which have an important 
stabilising and disciplining effect on debtor countries, but would keep them within reasonable 
limits. The GIPS countries would benefit at once because they would again be able to tap the 
markets for fresh capital. 
  A policy of stricter budget constraints would further demand a renunciation of the 
reckless tolerance to Target credits. A look at the United States can show what the solution 
might look like.  
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Target Balances in the United States  
 
Payment transactions in the United States are done via the Federal Reserve Wire Network 
(short: Fedwire) and operate in principle in a manner quite similar to that in the euro zone. For 
historical reasons the US currency area is divided into 12 Federal Reserve districts, whose 
borders are not identical with the borders of the federal states.
37  As a rule, the districts 
comprise several states, and in some instances a state may form part of two Federal Reserve 
districts. The size of the districts was fixed at the time the Federal  Reserve System was 
founded in 1913 and depended on the distribution of the population at the time. From an 
economic perspective, the districts are comparable to the 17 states of the euro zone.  
  In each district a regional Federal Reserve Bank is responsible for the operational 
implementation of monetary policy. Payments between commercial banks of different 
districts are done via the Fedwire system and are settled via the accounts of the commercial 
banks at the corresponding regional Federal Reserve Bank. The payments are booked in an 
Interdistrict Settlement Account, the equivalent of Europe’s Target real-time gross settlement 
system. In the same way in which in Europe all net payments between commercial banks of 
different countries are done via the Target system, the net payments between commercial 
banks of different districts are done in the U.S. via the Interdistrict Settlement Account. 
   While the Fedwire system operates basically in a way similar to the European Target 
system, there are several important differences.
38 First, the Fedwire system is a multilateral 
system of accounts in which each district’s Federal Reserve Bank has a settlement account 
vis-à-vis each of the eleven other Federal Reserve Banks. As in the Eurosystem, payment 
inflows lead to a build-up of claims of the corresponding district Fed, which must settle the 
payments by creating central bank money. This claim, however, is not on the entire central 
bank system, but on the district Fed from which the payment order was initiated. This other 
district Fed is assigned a corresponding liability. Unlike in the euro zone, no interest is 
accrued from the claims or paid on liabilities; this, however, does not constitute a real 
difference, since this type of interest income and expenditure is anyway socialised in the 
Eurosystem.  
  The most important difference from the European system is that the liabilities booked 
in the Interdistrict Settlement Account of the district Feds that borrowed additional funds for 
their economy from other districts for net purchases of goods and assets must be settled in 
April of each year.
39 According to official statements of the Federal Reserve, the debts are 
paid with gold certificates and then cancelled. Gold certificates are securities collateralised by 
gold, issued by the US Treasury, that bear the right to be exchanged for gold on demand.
40 
They are safe, marketable securities that cannot be created by the district Fed itself. 
                                                   
37 See K. Ruckriegel and F. Seitz, ”The Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve System Compared: Facts and 
Challenges“, ZEI Working Paper No. B02, 2002. 
38 See P. Garber, ”The Mechanics of Intra Euro Capital Flight“, op.cit. 
39 Payments are done only for deviations from average. If, for example, a regional Federal Reserve Bank A has 
accumulated claims on another Federal Reserve Bank B, these claims are reduced by the average balance of the 
Interdistrict Settlement Account of the past 12 months.  
40 In 1934 the entire gold stock of the Federal Reserve Banks was transferred to the US Treasury (Gold Reserve 
Act of 30 January 1934). In return the Federal Reserve Banks received gold certificates that bear the writing: 
“This is to certify that there are on deposit in the Treasury of the United States of America dollars in gold, 
payable to bearer on demand as authorized by law.” Since that time no gold certificates have been issued and the 
Federal Reserve Banks no longer own gold of their own. See C.J. Woelfel, “Encyclopedia of Banking and 
Finance”, 2002, 10
th edition, Routledge. 42 
 
  When during the crisis a policy of credit easing was adopted, this practice was 
abandoned and US Treasury securities were permitted for settling the balances, accepting in the 
end even mortgage-backed securities. This still does not make the US system similar to the 
European one, as in the US case the target debt has to be redeemed with marketable securities 
bearing normal interest rates, a proposal that had also been made in Europe but did not find 
particular  resonance.
41  They dissolve the debt relationship among the district Feds, and restore 
at each regional Fed that holds a claim the full availability of the assets. While this is analogous 
to the Target balances within one year, an accumulation of such balances over several years is 
not permitted. 
  It is correct that in the U.S. a district Fed may purchase the securities needed to settle 
the Target debt from the commercial banks with money it itself issued. This does not change 
the facts, however, as in this case, too, the district pays its bills with marketable securities 
bearing interest rates commensurate with the risk involved. By purchasing securities from its 
commercial banks, the district Fed reduces its potential for normal money creation through 
refinancing operations. Should it nonetheless print more money on balance, the excess money 
flows out to other districts, and new liabilities are created that must be settled. No matter how 
you look at it, the district must pay back its interdistrict debts each year with  valuable, 
marketable assets. While that is still a capital import through the European central bank 
system, it occurs under normal market conditions. In the US a district is only permitted to 
print more money than is used internally if it transfers marketable and normal interest-bearing 
assets to other districts.  
  If such a system were introduced in the euro zone, the NCBs of the GIPS would no 
longer have an interest in overexerting their money-printing presses in order to satisfy internal 
credit demand, since the main advantage of such a policy as compared to financing through 
the capital market is the favourable interest rate, and such an advantage would no longer exist. 
This results from the fact that market instruments price the risk into the interest rate, while 
credit from the Eurosystem does not. The latter operates upon the fiction that all national 
monetary systems are equally safe, while the market evidently thinks otherwise, as shown in 
Figure 11.  
  A couple of examples may help to clarify this point.  
1.  Say, the Greek NCB pays its Target liabilities with an instrument bearing a default 
probability identical to the probability of default of the Greek NCB and of its 
collateral. Let us say that this instrument is a Greek government bond, and that the 
default probability is 5%. (In reality, the market estimates this default probability at a 
double-digit percentage.) If the interest rate for safe bonds, which may be equal to the 
ECB’s main refinancing rate, is 1%, the interest rate for Greek government bonds 
would be 6%. If the Greek NCB redeems the Target liability bearing a 1% interest rate 
with a Greek government bond, it would take a 5% interest rate loss, just as much as 
the default probability. 
2.  The Greek NCB pays its Target liabilities with a safe instrument bearing 1% interest. 
In this case, at first sight it pays the same interest as for the Target loan, but due to the 
differing default probabilities this is only apparently so. In order to compare the 
interest rates, although they belong to different risk categories, it would be necessary 
to compare their mathematical expected value (i.e. the arithmetic mean of the various 
possible effective interest rates). For the default probability assumed, the mathematical 
                                                   
41 See K. Reeh, “Zahlungsbilanzausgleich in der Währungsunion. Viele Frage, aber noch keine Antworten,” loc. 
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expectation of the interest rate for the Target loan is -  4% (= 1% -  5%), and the 
mathematical expectation of the safe interest rate is 1%. Again, the redemption of the 
Target liability brings an interest rate loss of 5%, the default probability. Redeeming 
the Target loans with marketable assets would make these loans totally unattractive, 
since if market rates have to be paid for Target loans, then you might as well tap the 
capital markets.  
  In view of the political tour de force that would be necessary for introducing the US 
system in Europe, the question arises of whether the problem of overflowing Target loans 
could be solved by milder policy options. For example, a return to higher collateral demands 
for the refinancing operations would surely result in less central bank credit being granted in 
the GIPS countries. This would in fact have the desired effects if the collateral standards are 
set high enough. The problem with such a measure, however, is that it cannot be implemented 
credibly, as in any halfway-serious crisis the European Central Bank will again tend to ease 
its collateral standards. This problem can hardly be solved if the Governing Council, thanks to 
its present power structure,  has the corresponding decision-making power. 
  A similarly pessimistic  argument applies to a possible renunciation of the full-
allotment policy. Even if the ECB were to limit the money supply by returning to the pre-
crisis variable-rate tenders, it would not be able to prevent the least solid commercial banks 
from making the highest interest-rate offers because anything they offer is more favourable 
than the excessively high interest rates they have to offer private lenders.
42 The lion’s share of 
the central bank credit would therefore still be created in the GIPS countries.  
  We consider such hopes and solution proposals moot, as there is, after all, a 
functioning system in the USA that Europe needs only copy. The Eurosystem could adopt the 
rules prevailing in the USA, according to which the Target debt has to be settled once a year 
with the transfer  of  marketable assets. Otherwise, huge capital flows will run through the 
Target system again and again, pushing the Eurosystem to its limits and creating political 
situations like the one in which the European Union and the euro in particular find themselves 
today. We cannot imagine that the European idea would survive this unscathed.  
  There is no denying that a country like Ireland, whose Target debt is about as big as its 
GDP, cannot be forced from one day to the next to repay its debt. A transition strategy must 
surely be defined. However,  in the end, Europe has no option but to terminate its policy of 
soft budget constraints if it wants to have a future. 
                                                   
42  See  A. Chailloux, S. Gray and R. McCaughrin, “Central Bank Collateral Frameworks: Principles and 




Reply to the critics  
The controversy on the Target payment system has become more heated recently, and H.-W. 
Sinn has been criticised  harshly.  However, much of the criticism is based on 
misunderstandings, the origin of which in some cases we cannot fathom.  Here, we reply to 
the points the critics have made.   
  From the large set of critics we want to single out Willem Buiter et al.
43 and Karl 
Whelan,
44 as their views and arguments are of a scholarly nature and are also implicitly or 
explicitly reflected in many critical bloggers’ writings. 
 
1.  Net liabilities within the Target system do not represent financing of current account 
deficits of the respective countries (Buiter). 
As explained by one of us in an article in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 4 April 2011 and 
reiterated in this paper, by definition the increase in a country’s Target liability equals the sum 
of the current account deficit and the private and public net capital exports or, equivalently, 
that part of a country’s current account deficit that is not financed by private and public 
capital imports.
45 This was, to our knowledge, the first time this interpretation of the Target 
balances was presented, and we hope the critics acknowledge its correctness.
46 In this paper 
we specified this definition in more detail. This is not an inherently empirical question but one 
of economic theory and logic that re-interprets the Target balances. However, an empirical 
question is how small the capital inflows were, if any, and to what extent the increase in the 
Target debts approached the current account deficits.  In Figure 13 we showed that both 
quantities were of similar size for the aggregate of the GIPS countries if summed and 
accumulated over the years 2008, 2009 and 2010. The accumulated sum of the GIPS Target 
debt was about nine tenths of the accumulated sum of GIPS current account deficits over that 
period. Thus, indeed, Target credit largely financed the current account deficits of this group 
of countries over that period. 
This, of itself, is just a description of facts and no assertion regarding correlations or causality. 
In numerous articles on this issue, H.-W. Sinn has emphasized that Ireland took on more and 
Spain less Target debt than would have been necessary to fully finance their current account 
                                                   
43  W. Buiter, E. Rahbari, and J. Michels, “TARGETing the Wrong Villain: Target2 and Intra-Eurosystem 
Imbalances and Credit Flows”, Citi Global Economics View, June 9, 2011. 
44 K. Whelan: “Professor Sinn Misses the Target”, IIEA Blog, http://www.iiea.com/blogosphere/professor-sinn-
misses-the-target, June 7, 2011. 
45 H.-W. Sinn, “Die riskante Kreditersatzpolitik der EZB”,  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, op. cit. See also H.-
W. Sinn. “Target-Salden, Außenhandel und Geldschöpfung”, ifo Schnelldienst, op. cit., and  H.-W. Sinn, “The 
ECB’s Stealth Bailout”, VOX, op. cit. 
46 U. Bindseil and P. J. König, “The Economics of Target2 Balances,” SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2011-035, 14 
June 2011, do not agree. On p. 24 they criticise a formulation of H.-W. Sinn that deals with the “current account 
deficit” and they accuse him of misunderstanding bank balance sheets. However, they assume that he means 
what in US English is understood as a checking account. Such is not the case, as H.-W. Sinn had told P. König in 
an earlier conversation. But they apparently still maintain this position. In another part of the paper they use the 
economic term, making a criticism similar to that of Buiter. We fail to understand their point.    
 45 
 
deficits. In his first Handelsblatt article on 6 May, Sinn wrote concerning the comparison with 
current account deficits:
47 
“Bei genauerem Hinsehen stellt man freilich fest, dass Irland sich im Übermaß über die 
Target-Kredite verschuldet hat, während Spanien deutlich zurückhaltender war. Das könnte 
einer der Gründe sein, weshalb Spanien bislang noch nicht unter den Rettungsschirm gedrängt 
wurde. ” 
(At closer inspection, we find that Ireland ran up its debts excessively via Target  credits, 
while Spain was more circumspect. This might be one of the reasons why Spain has not yet 
been pushed into the European Financial Stability Facility.) 
Similarly, he wrote on 1 June in his first VOX article on the subject:
48 
“Although Spain took less and Ireland more than their respective current-account deficits, the 
ECB, and indeed effectively the Bundesbank, replaced private capital flows that would 
otherwise have been needed to finance the GIPS’s current-account deficits.” 
  We discussed this in more detail above in the context of Figures 13 and 14. 
 
2. Target2 liabilities do not represent bilateral claims of the Bundesbank on other central 
banks – like claims on the Central Bank of Ireland (Whelan). The Bundesbank’s stock of net 
Target claims does not reflect exposure to risk or potential financial losses, because risk and 
potential losses are shared within the Eurosystem (Buiter). 
  H.-W. Sinn never argued that other countries would not share the Bundesbank’s 
Target risks. We discussed this point above in Chapter 2 in the context of the reaction of the 
Bundesbank. The first calculation by Sinn of the Bundesbank’s risk was published in 
Süddeutsche Zeitung on 2 April 2011, stating that Germany is liable for the ECB’s claims 
against the GIPS countries in proportion to its ECB capital share.
49 This is exactly the rule 
Buiter and Whelan say applies.  
 
3.  As the ECB does not target the money stock (Buiter and Whelan), but pursues a full 
allotment policy, money and credit stock are endogenously determined by money demand 
(Buiter). 
So it is. H.-W. Sinn never said otherwise. The sentence that may have led to the 
misunderstanding, first in the German debate and then spilling over to the English-language 
one, 
50 was perhaps the following, from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
51:  
                                                   
47 H.-W. Sinn,  “Die heimlichen Kredite”, Handelsblatt, No. 88,  May 6, 2011, p. 72. 
48 H.-W. Sinn, ibid.  
49 H.-W. Sinn, “Tickende Zeitbombe”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, loc. cit. 
50 Cf. O. Storbeck, “Traktoren, Targetsalden, Trugschlüsse – HWS hat sich verrannt”, Handelsblatt Blog,  Juni 3, 
2011,  http://blog.handelsblatt.com/handelsblog/2011/06/03/traktoren-targetsalden-trugschlusse-hws-hat-sich-
verrannt. And  O. Storbeck, “The stealth bailout that doesn’t exist: debunking Hans-Werner Sinn”, June 6, 2011, 
http://olafstorbeck.com/2011/06/06/the-stealth-bailout-that-doesn%e2%80%99t-exist-debunking-hans-werner-
sinn/.  See also M. Schieritz, “Die Irrtümer des Hans-Werner Sinn (Folge II) ”, Zeit Blog, 5. Mai 2011, 
http://blog.zeit.de/herdentrieb/2011/05/05/die-irrtumer-des-hans-werner-sinn-folge-ii_3004. An earlier version of 
this paper had a formulation that could have been misunderstood as saying that a blogger had mistranslated a 
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“Da nach der Überweisung (durch das Target-System) zu viel Zentralbankgeld in Deutschland 
in Umlauf ist,  kann die Bundesbank nur entsprechend weniger an die deutschen Banken 
verleihen.“ 
(Since too much central bank money is circulating in Germany after the swift transfer 
(through the Target system), the Bundesbank can only lend correspondingly less to German 
banks.) 
  This was never meant to say that the money supply was fixed. In his first VOX piece, 
to which Buiter and Whelan refer, Sinn made it clear that he meant demand rather than supply 
(even though he then also said that his statement would also hold if supply were fixed):
52 
“The crowding out will not necessarily occur, but it is the normal case to be expected as, 
given Germany’s GDP and given Germany’s payment habits, the commercial banks only need 
a certain amount of euros for circulation in Germany.”  
In his second VOX article, where he replied to the critics, he said:
53 
“Given the payment habits, economic activity and the ECB interest rate, only a given amount 
of central bank money is needed. Any excess liquidity brings no benefit and only involves 
interest costs. The German commercial banks can, at present, borrow as much money from 
the Bundesbank as they wish, but they do not want to.”  
  This does mean that the money stock is endogenously determined. We specify this in 
more detail in Figure 7 above. What is determined is the demand for money, not the supply. 
Thus, the money flowing in through the Target balances crowds out money generated by the 
national central banks via credit (refinancing operations). As shown in this paper, this does 
imply that credit is being shifted from one country to another. We hope we have clarified this 
important point here. And we hope that it is also clear from the discussion in this paper that 
we never thought of credit constraints. We just talk of aggregate budget constraints, which are 
among the iron laws of economics.    
4. The procedures of the Interdistrict Settlement Account in the US central bank system 
(Federal Reserve System) do not limit the flow of credit through the central bank system 
because the central banks of the individual districts can buy the securities with which they 
must pay for the interdisctrict balances with money that they create themselves (Buiter). The 
districts of the Federal Reserve System have no fiscal relationships to the states in the US. 
(Whelan). 
  We have quite a different view on this. The rules for the Interdistrict Settlement 
Accounts demand from each Fed branch that they settle the mutually build-up interdistrict 
balances in April of each year. There is no joint responsibility with a common liability-
sharing rule as in Europe. Each district branch of the Fed must settle its interdistrict balances 
with marketable assets such as Treasury bonds. Although it is true that the Fed branches can 
buy these securities with central bank money created by them, as argued by Buiter, this is no 
help, as it still means that a district, that has an interdictrict debt must settle it by selling 
marketable assets bearing a normal interest rate. This makes excessive money and credit 
creation unattractive. The additional central bank money will either crowd out any other 
                                                                                                                                                               
51 H.-W. Sinn, “Die riskante Kreditersatzpolitik der EZB”, op. cit.  
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money and credit creation in the district or, if it leaves the district, will generate a new 
interdistrict Target debt that will have to be settled again. While the possibility exists, as in 
Europe, to effect a capital import through the central bank system, in the US it would take 
place at normal market conditions instead of at a uniform main refinancing rate. Unlike in 
Europe, in the US low-interest capital imports cannot be exacted through the payment system 
of the central bank system. Of course, the districts of the US are not the same as the states of 
Europe. Yet, the economic situation with 17 euro countries and 12 US districts is certainly 
comparable.  
 
5. There should be no cap on Target accounts, and Target accounts should not be settled each 
year, because Ireland would then have to repay a debt of 150 billion euros, as much as the 
Irish GDP (Whelan). 
We understand of course that Ireland would have a huge problem if our proposal were 
implemented. Clearly, we cannot ask Ireland to repay its Target debt immediately. However, 
all debts need to be repaid or at least be serviced such that Ireland’s debt-to-GDP ratio, 
including its Target debt, returns to reasonable levels. We agree that Ireland needs time, and 
we also acknowledge that Ireland has shown by far the largest progress of all the GIPS in 
trying to improve its competitiveness through a substantial real depreciation. Thanks to this, 
Ireland’s current account has recently been moving towards the positive range. Still, we insist 
that Europe could develop a plan for moving towards the US type of settlement for Target 
debts. The current system is dangerous, because it is prone to a build-up of such gigantic 
external debts via the Eurosystem that it might one day grow out of control. 
 